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INTRODUCTION

Part of the broadened scope of Canadian combines law effected by the
recent amendments to the Combines Investigation Act' is the creation of a
class of trade practices reviewable by the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (RTPC) at the behest of the Director of Investigation and Research.
The Commission may make orders prohibiting suppliers from continuing to
engage in any of the practices where the Commission finds certain anticompetitive effects to be present. These practices, five in number, describe generally certain restrictions sometimes imposed by suppliers of products upon
their customers; hence the practices may be denominated generically 'vertical
restraints' - to distinguish them from the 'horizontal' agreements entered into
by producers with each other in order to restrain competition among themselves. The practices reviewable under the amended Combines Investigation
Act are consignment selling, refusal to deal, market restriction, exclusive dealing and tied selling.2
This paper is concerned solely with the last two of the listed practices
exclusive dealing and tied selling. The considerations that the writer believes
should be relevant to the Commission's consideration of these practices will
be discussed, and certain outlines of the law relating to exclusive dealing and
to tied selling as it is believed likely to develop in Canada will be sketched.
In considering these practices, the RTPC will have almost no Canadian precedent by which to be guided.8 Therefore, the Commission might well take as
points of departure the law that has developed in the United States and in
Australia, in both of which jurisdictions there is legislation substantively very
similar to the exclusive dealing and tied selling provisions of the Combines

1 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23. An Act to Amend the Combines Investigation Act 1975,
S.C. 1975, c. 76, came into force on January 1, 1976, except for certain provisions, not
relevant here, relating to the service industries, which did not come into force until July
1, 1976. The amendments are reviewed in toto in G. Kaiser, The New Competition Law:
Stage One (1976), 1 C.B.LJ. 147.
2 C.I.A., ss. 31.2 (refusal to deal), 31.3 (consignment selling), 31.4 (market restriction, exclusive dealing and tied selling). The Commission is also empowered, at the
instance of the Director, to make orders against the implementation in Canada of foreign
judgments, decrees, laws or directives where the effect of such implementation would
be to injure trade, commerce or competition in Canada. C.I.A., ss. 31.5, 31.6.
3 There is, however, case law, better developed in the United Kingdom and in
Australia than in Canada, construing exclusive dealing arrangements under the common
law doctrine of restraint of trade. See, e.g.: Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Harper's Garage
(Stourport) Ltd., [1968] A.C. 269 (H.L.); Amoco Australia Ltd. v. Rocca Bros. Motor
Engineering Co. Ltd. (1973), 1. A.L.R. 385 (High Ct.), afl'd, [1975] 1 All E.R. 968
(P.C.); Stephens v. Gulf Oil Canada Ltd. (1974), 3 O.R. (3d) 241; 45 D.L.R. (3d) 161,
rev'd., (1976), I1 O.R. (2d) 129; 65 D.L.R. (3d) 193. See generally, M.Q. Connelly,
Vertically Imposed Restrictions in the Gasoline Industry at Common Law (1976), 14
O.H.L.J, I.
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Investigation Act. This paper will review the law of those jurisdictions. 4 The
main industry considered in this paper as illustrative of exclusive dealing and
tied selling is the retail distribution of gasoline and related products: 5 that
industry provides convenient textbook examples of the practices, and in fact
4 The law in the United Kingdom has not really advanced beyond its common law
status, set out in Esso v. Harper's Garage, supra, note 3. Under s. 1(1) of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976, c. 34, an agreement between two or more persons
carrying on business within the U.K. in the production or supply of goods, under which
restrictions in respect of certain specified matters enumerated in s. 6 of the Act are
accepted by two or more parties, must be registered with the Director-General of Fair
Trading. Unless insignificant, a registered agreement is then reviewed by the Restrictive
Practices Court, which determines whether any of the restrictions are contrary to the
public interest: ss. 1(2)(c), 1(3), 2(2). An agreement found to be contrary to the public interest shall be void with respect to the offending restrictions (s. 2(1)) and the
Court may make an order restraining the parties from carrying out the agreement in
respect of the restrictions (s. 2(2)). Exclusive dealing agreements are, however, generally
exempt from registration by the terms of s. 28 and Schedule 3 of the Act, and a tying
agreement would not be registrable unless both parties to it accepted one or more of
the restrictions specified in s. 6. There are no reported cases in which the Restrictive
Practices Court has considered either exclusive dealing or tied selling, except incidentally
where they have appeared as parts of larger, horizontal restrictive arrangements among
suppliers. Exclusive dealing and tied selling may also be investigated by the Monopolies
and Mergers Commission, on a reference from the Director-General of Fair Trading
or the Secretary of State, where it appears that a "monopoly situation" exists: s. 6 and
Part IV, Fair Trading Act 1973, c. 41; and see, Report on the Supply of Petrol to
Retailers in the U.K., 1965 H.C.P. 264 and Report on the Supply of Beer, 1969 H.C.P.
216.
Space prohibits examination of the voluminous E.E.C. jurisprudence regarding exclusive dealing and tied selling under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. See
generally, W. Alexander, The EEC Rules of Competition (London: Kluwer Harrap
Handbooks, 1973) at 71-79; C. Bellamy and G. D. Child, Common Market Law of
Competition (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1973) at 70, 76-77, 172-95; and V. Korah,
Competition Law of Britain and the Common Market (London: Paul Elek, 1975) at
232-39.
Since the United Kingdom's accession to the E.E.C. on 1st January 1973, the E.E.C.
rules of competition have become part of U.K. law: European Communities Act 1972,
c. 68, s. 2(1). The complex subject of the interaction of U.K. restrictive practices legislation and the E.E.C. rules of competition is dealt with in s. 10 of the European Communities Act. See generally, Korah at 227-30.
5
Not included within this paper is price discrimination, a highly charged topic in
the gasoline industry today because of the complaints of the 'independent' brand-name
service station operators that their suppliers, the large oil companies, are price discriminating in favour of company owned and operated outlets. See, e.g., Ontario Retail
Gasoline and Automotive Service Association, Brief to the Royal Commission on
Petroleum Products Pricing - Ontario (January 21, 1976) at 10-11, 14. See also remarks of M. Bertrand (Director of Investigation and Research) in H.C. Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs, Proceedings, No. 52 (May 29, 1975)
at 7-8, to the effect that the alleged problem of price discrimination in the gasoline industry is not within the scope of the section of the Act dealing with exclusive dealing
and tied selling. On the law relating to price discrimination, see, R. S. Nozick, The
Regulation of Price Discrimination Under the Combines Investigation Act (1976), 54
C.B.R. 309. Prof. Nozick concludes (at 317) that, because s. 34 (1)(a) requires that
price discrimination, in order to be illegal, must be among different groups of purchasers
and because favourably treated, manufacturer-owned outlets are not purchasers, therefore "those situations where a vertically integrated manufacturer-distributor sells at
a price to independent distributors such that it can undercut the independent distributors
at its own distributing level of operations" are excluded from the operation of s. 34(1)(a).
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it has frequently been cited as an example in the legislative history of section
31.4. 6 Furthermore, the industry has occasioned a wealth of jurisprudence and
scholarly comment in the relevant jurisdictions.
Exclusive dealing is the practice whereby a supplier sells a product on
condition that the customer take all of his requirements of that product from
that supplier or, what is the same thing, refrain from purchasing products of
the same class from the supplier's competitors. An exclusive dealing arrangement may exist between any two levels of distribution from production to
consumption. For example, firm X, which is both a producer and wholesaler
of gasoline, may insist that service station retailers to whom it sells deal only
in X-brand gasoline. Or firm Y, a miller, may require bakeries to which it sells
flour to use exclusively Y-brand flour in baking. This latter type of exclusive
dealing arrangement, where the restrained customer is itself the ultimate user
of the product, rather than a dealer in it, is sometimes called a 'requirements'
7
contract.
Tying or tied selling is the practice whereby the supplier of a product
sells or leases that product (the tying product) upon condition that the purchaser or lessee agrees to take his requirements of some other product (the
tied product) from that supplier or another designated by him. A tying arrangement, therefore, is a form of exclusive dealing that involves two distinct
products. Frequently the tied product is something used in conjunction with
the tying product, such as punch cards in a computer or paper in a photocopier. Where the supplier of the tied product is not the supplier of the tying
product, but rather a source designated by the latter, the arrangement is referred to as 'directed buying'. Directed buying usually implies some form of
'market access arrangement' whereby, in the most common form, the designated supplier of the tied product agrees to pay a commission to the supplier
of the tying product on sales made to the latter's customers. 8 An example of
this type of arrangement would occur where firm X, an oil company, requires
its service station dealers to stock exclusively (or predominantly) the tires
manufactured by firm R, a rubber company. Under typical arrangements, firm
R would pay a commission to firm X on all sales of tires by R to X's dealers.
Where a tying arrangement takes the form of a supplier declining to furnish
a dealer with one product unless the dealer will agree to stock other products
made by the same supplier, it is called 'full-line forcing'. 9
To summarize: in exclusive dealing, the supplier says to the customer,
0 H. C. Committee Proceedings,supra, note 5, No. 49 (May 20, 1975) at 28, No.
51 (May 27, 1975) at 28, No. 52 (May 29, 1975) at 13-17, No. 55 (June 3, 1975) at
93-94; Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Proceedings,No.
35 (April 23, 1975) at 23, No. 66 (November 27, 1975) at 5-6.
7
Kaiser, supra, note 1 at 161. Some of the literature uses the term requirements
contract to indicate an obligation imposed by the customer upon the supplier to fill all
of the customer's requirements for the product. Requirements contracts in this latter
sense are not within the purview of s. 31.4 of the C.I.A. But see, text following note 94,

infra.8

See, Economic Council of Canada, Interim Report on Competition Policy (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969) at viii-ix.

RId.
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"I will sell you my widgets only if you will buy all of your widgets from me";
in tying, the supplier says, "I will sell you my widgets only if you buy my
gidgets."
B.

ANTECEDENTS TO THE NEW LEGISLATION

1.

TBA and Other Reports

In 1962 the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission published its Report
on an Inquiry Into the Distribution and Sale of Automotive Oils, Greases,
Anti-Freeze, Additives, Tires, Batteries, Accessories and Related Products popularly known as the TBA Report.1° The Commission recommended that
the practices of exclusive dealing and tied selling, including full-line forcing
and directed buying, should be included within the coverage of the Combines
Investigation Act and that the practices should be prohibited where they would
be "likely to lessen competition substantially, tend to create a monopoly or
exclude competitors from a market to a significant degree."" In 1971, the
Royal Commission on Farm Machinery recommended that exclusive dealing
arrangements in farm machinery be made illegal? 2 Meanwhile, in 1969 the
Economic Council of Canada's Interim Report on Competition Policy, to
which much of the Stage I Combines Act amendments is more or less directly
traceable, had recommended that exclusive dealing and tied selling be included
among a group of practices to be reviewable by a "Competitive Practices
Tribunal." The Tribunal would have been empowered to enjoin a practice
where it determined that the effect of the practice was to lessen competition
to the detriment of final consumers. 13 The Council made this recommendation
with particular reference to the retail distribution of petroleum and related
products. 14 Two aspects of the recommendations of the ECC that have not
been followed in the legislation were that the tribunal should have an interim
injunctive power pending final disposition of a case and that a member of the
public, as well as the Director of Investigation and Research, should be able
to bring cases to the Tribunal's attention. The Government's determination
not to follow this latter recommendation, in particular, may constrict substantially the ultimate development of the law.
The TBA Report looked comprehensively at the manner in which all
products other than gasoline were distributed at service stations. The Report
divided both the classes of service station and the types of products distributed
thereat in a manner that is of continuing usefulness. Service stations were
broken down into four categories: company owned and operated stations,
where the operator is in effect an employee of the oil company; lessee operated
Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962.
11 TBA Report, at 133.

1o

12 Report of the Royal Commission on Farm Machinery (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,

1971) at 255.
13 Supra, note 8 at 122.
14 The Council noted (id. at 124) that in the request made to it in 1966 to study

combines, mergers and related matters, the President of the Privy Council had stated
that it was unlikely that the recommendations of the RTPC in the TBA Report could
be carried out under an exclusively criminal law regime for competition law.
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stations; financially assisted stations, which are owned by an operator to whom
the oil company has extended financial assistance, frequently secured by a
mortgage; and independent, brand stations, whose operators either own them
or lease them from third parties. 15 Even in these latter stations, the Report
found that usually the dispensing equipment was obtained on loan from the
oil company or via a conditional sales agreement with the oil company. 16
The products sold at service stations were also divided into four categories: gasoline, with which the Report was not concerned; other petroleum
products, such as lubricating oils and greases; anti-freeze; and tires, batteries
and accessories (t.b.a.). Accessories include such items, among many others,
as spark plugs, points, condensers, windshield wiper blades, hose clamps and
floor mats.
The TBA Report found that most of the oil companies insisted upon
exclusive dealing with respect to petroleum products. 17 In fact, there can be
some nice questions of terminology with respect to the petroleum products.
If all petroleum products distributed through service stations are considered
one product, then it is correct to refer to exclusive dealing. If, on the other
hand, gasoline, the main product, is considered a separate product, then the
other petroleum products are tied to it. Or it may be considered that the
petroleum products as a whole18are tied to the service station's license to use
the oil company's trade name.
With respect to non-petroleum products, that is, anti-freeze and t.b.a.,
the oil companies were found not to manufacture these items, but two kinds
of oil company sponsorship were found to be present. Occasionally a very
large oil company would purchase these products from an independent source
manufacturing to the oil company's specifications and under its brand name,
as in the case, for example, of Imperial Oil Company and Atlas tires and
batteries. Other oil companies had 'market access' arrangements with independent manufacturers, whereby the oil company would promote sales of the
manufacturer's products to the oil company's brand-name service stations in
return for a commission paid by the manufacturer to the oil company on all
such sales. Whether or not the purchase-resale and market access arrangements can correctly be called tied selling or full-line forcing depends upon the
15 Supra, note 10 at 10-11. The last category of stations should not be confused
with independent, non-brand stations, which are not contractually bound to any particular oil company. The only thing "independent" about the independent, brand stations
is that they are not owned by or mortgaged to an oil company.
10 The Commission (id. at 18) found that as of 1958 company-operated accounted
for 0.9% of all service stations in Canada, lessee operated - 25.6%, financially assisted
15.4%, and independent, brand - 58.1%. On the whole, the leased stations tended

to be larger volume outlets than the dealer-owned stations. Id. at 23.
17 Id. at 40-48.
18 See, M. L. Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing (1960), 55 Northw. L. Rev.
62 at 92-93.
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degree of coercion practiced by the oil companies upon the service stations.' 9
For these purposes, the company operated stations can be ignored since within
a single firm there is no sale of products. While the TBA Report found considerable variety among the various oil companies with respect to the marketing of non-petroleum products by their service stations, it was found that
lessee stations were much more subject to oil company pressure in this regard
than were the various types of owner-operated stations.
2.

The Pros and Cons of the Practices

Most of the objections to the practices of exclusive dealing and tied selling that have made them a matter of legislative concern were adumbrated in
the TBA Report. It is appropriate, however, first to look at the practices'
alleged benefits, of which the writer has been able to identify from the TBA
Report and other sources some seven.
First, in the case of automotive service stations, the oil companies have
very large investments in those which are lessee operated or otherwise financially assisted. Such investments are not recouped by the rents or the interest
charged on loans and therefore, from a company's point of view, can be
justified only as investment in outlets for the exclusive sale of that company's
products. Why should any company make an investment in what may prove
to be an outlet for its competitor's products?
Secondly, forcing a producer's brand-name outlets to deal exclusively
avoids customer confusion. Customers can rely on being sold only the products
made or sponsored by the company whose trade name is used by the retailer.
If a service station bears in huge letters the name of Gulf, for example,
certainly customers expect to purchase the gasoline manufactured by Gulf and
not that of some other company. Customer expectations with respect to the
other products sold at service stations is a somewhat more doubtful matter
upon which to speculate.
Third, exclusive dealing as applied to products that require a lot of
servicing, such as automobiles, may promote a legitimate interest of producers
in having their distributors maintain sufficiently specialized service departments.
Fourth, exclusive dealing may aid producers' efficiency, thereby lowering
their costs by permitting planning on the basis of a relatively known demand.
It is doubtful, however, just how beneficial from the public's point of view
this benefit to producers would be. As one eminent American antitrust scholar
has observed:
This objective, of course, cannot be truly achieved by resorting to exclusive contracts, for sellers will still have to contend with fluctuations in the ultimate demand
for their goods. Whatever stability is achieved, therefore, must result from the
protection that 'exclusives' provide against fluctuations resulting from the loss of
19See, infra, notes 113-15, 142-61 and accompanying text.
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sales to competitors. Such stability, however, is hardly to be given much weight
under a statute expressly designed to preserve competition, for the constant danger

of losing business to one's rivals strikes close to the heart of
system. 20

.

.

a competitive

Fifth, exclusive dealing is claimed to provide numerous advantages to
dealers, and requirements contracts allegedly provide similar gains to users
of the product in question. They are assured of continuous supply even in
times of shortage, at least if the contract contains no escape clause for the
supplier.2 ' At the same time, dealers are relieved of the need to carry large
inventories. In the example of gasoline, they may benefit from the cheaper
prices made possible by deliveries in large 'drops.' To the extent exclusive
dealing yields these advantages, one would expect dealers to favour it even
in the absence of coercion from producers. In fact, the TBA Report did not
reveal widespread dissatisfaction on the part of service station operators with
the practice of exclusive dealing in petroleum products. As for full-line forcing
of t.b.a., where the oil company uses a purchase and resale method of distribution, it can expect to realize economies of large scale purchasing, which
it may pass on to its service station dealers. It should be noted that under
market access arrangements for t.b.a., such economies will not occur, since
each service station dealer must still purchase individually from the designated
supplier.
Sixth, as to tied selling, when it is employed by a firm that offers the tying
product at a low price on condition that the tied product be purchased also,
the effect may be to benefit users of the tying and tied products. The arrangement could benefit competition in the user's industry if entry into that industry
is facilitated by virtue of the low amount of capital required to obtain the
tying product under the arrangement as compared to a much greater capital
outlay that would be required to obtain it in the absence of the arrangement.
In such a case, "the user agrees to the arrangement, not because he must buy
the controlled product from the supplier, but because the tying arrangement
2

0D. C. Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements
Under the Clayton Act, [1961] Sup. Ct. Rev. 267 at 307. See also, W. B. Lockhart and
H. R. Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive
Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act (1952), 65 Harv. L. Rev. 913 at
926. In Anchor Serum Co. (1954), 50 FTC 681 at 689-90, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, far from finding the producer's cost reductions a justification for exclusive
dealing, regarded them as positively pernicious.
[The exclusive dealing] contracts . . . have had the further result and effect of
enabling respondent to operate its facilities at top capacity, consistent with its
foreseeable selling ability, and avoiding the fluctuations incident to high and low
production periods, thus reducing unit costs to a minimum, advantages denied
respondent's competitors who did not indulge in respondent's practice of securing
full-requirement contracts.
The Commission found that Anchor's competitors were unable to find wholesale outlets
for their products because the wholesalers, in turn, were unable to compete with those
who got a lower price from Anchor. Anchor, in other words, passed on its cost savings.
23 Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. (1961), 365 U.S. 320 at 334. In the
gasoline industry, however, it is common not to provide an absolute obligation to supply
on the part of the oil company. Rather, in the event that the company is unable to make
deliveries, the dealer is then free to purchase from other sources.
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provides the most advantageous method of securing both machinery and
supplies." 22 Where a supplier in a tied selling arrangement offers the tying
product at an unremunerative rate, he may in effect merely be cutting the
price on the tied product. 23 If the tied product industry is oligopolistic, then
there is not likely to be much price competition because of the phenomenon
of mutual recognition of interdependence. Therefore, whatever price competition there is to be in the tied product must take more devious forms, such
as offering the tying product cheaply. "One may prefer
24 'hard' competition,
yet still prefer the substitute to no competition at all."
Finally, tying arrangements may protect the producer's good will in technologically complicated products, by specifying the products that are to be
used with them for proper functioning.
As against these asserted advantages of exclusive dealing and tied selling,
what are the alleged anti-competitive aspects?
Taking exclusive dealing first, the most common objection is that it
creates barriers to new competition in the production of the subject product.
For example, if in the gasoline industry the vast majority of service stations
are limited to dealing in the products of one supplier, then any new producer
of gasoline or lubricating oil or anti-freeze must enter the industry not only
at the production level but also at the distribution level because the existing
channels of distribution have already been sewn up by the other producers.
The fact that new entry must occur at more than one level makes such entry
difficult and tends toward the maintenance of the industry as the preserve of
the firms with exclusive dealing contracts. The capital required to enter at
every level will likely be a great deal higher than that required to enter at the
production level only, and this will tend to impede entry. The effect of such
arrangements, especially in oligopolistic markets, may be "to enable the established suppliers individually to maintain their own standing and at the same
time collectively, even though not collusively, to prevent a late arrival from
wresting away more than an insignificant proportion of the market." 25
In the TBA Report, the Director of Investigation and Research concluded that the oil companies' various exclusive dealing practices resulted in
the exclusion of independent producers and wholesalers (those that are neither
oil companies nor have market access arrangements with oil companies) from
a "significant" proportion of the service station market for all products other
than accessories. 26
22

Lackhart and Sacks, supra, note 20, at 948. In FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co.

(1923), 261 U.S. 463 at 475, the U.S. Supreme Court on this reasoning found a tying
arrangement (pumps tied to gasoline) not to violate the Clayton Act.
2
3See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v.
United States Steel Corp. (1969), 394 U.S. 495 at 510.
24 D. F. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws
(1958), 72 Harv. L. Rev. 50 at 65.
25 Standard Oil Company of Californiav. United States (1949), 337 U.S. 293 at 309.
26
Supra, note 10 at 75. "Significant" was defined in the TEA Report (at 67) to
mean at least 15 to 30%.
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The barriers to entry theory is the chief objection to the practice of exclusive dealing, but the theory's validity has not gone unchallenged.2 7 The contrary argument is to the effect that where there is a profit to be made efficient
capital markets will allocate sufficient funds to the new producer so that entry
can be made at all the necessary levels. If the barriers to entry theory were
effectively demolished by empirical studies showing that entry has been frequent into industries characterized by exclusive dealing, then exclusive dealing
as an area of concern in competition policy would, at a minimum, have to be
carefully rethought. There are, however, other objections sometimes advanced
against the practice. In the automotive products situation, for example, the
RTPC concluded that full-line forcing and market access arrangements tend
to raise prices to consumers because to the extent suppliers have assured
markets they have little incentive to compete vigorously as to price and because, in the case of market access arrangements, the commissions payable to
the oil companies by the t.b.a. producers raise the latter's costs. 8 Furthermore, market access arrangements were found to favour the larger manufacturers of the subject products since "oil companies with national or large
regional service station networks are likely to enter into exclusive arrangements with manufacturers who operate on a national basis or have extensive
distributive facilities." 2 9 The Commission also concluded that the oil companies' various exclusive dealing practices resulted in an "unnecessary duplication and proliferation" of service stations.3 0 This was thought to follow logically from the companies' claim that one reason they need exclusive dealing is
because the rents they receive on service stations they own are not sufficient
to justify the capital investment. Assuming that the lessees cannot be made to
pay a higher rent, in the absence of exclusive dealing there would be fewer
stations built for lease. It is difficult to declare with absolute confidence that
the very large number of service stations presently to be found in metropolitan
areas is excessive, and from the public's point of view the cost in unsightliness may be felt to be recouped in terms of convenience and no queuing. It

27 The authorities pro and con the barriers to entry theory are reviewed in Note:
Refusals to Deal by Vertically Integrated Monopolists (1974), 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1720
at 1725-32. See also, D. Needham, "Potential Entry Into Oligopoly" in Readings in
Microeconomics, Breit and Hochman eds., (Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1971).
The failure of the barriers to entry theory to win the universal assent of economists was
noted by Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co. (1967),
386 U.S. 568 at 581, a case involving a "product extension" type merger under s. 7
of the Clayton Act.
28 Id. at 128. One would expect, however, that the costs represented by the commissions would be to some extent offset by lower advertising costs for the tb.a. producers with market access arrangements as compared with producers without such
arrangements.
20 Id.at 132.
80 Id. at 124-25.
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seems unlikely, however, that an intolerable degree of queuing would necessarily occur in the absence of a gas station on every corner.
When the practice of tying the sale of one product to that of another is
engaged in by a firm with market power over the tying product, American
jurisprudence has relegated the practice to the status of a per se antitrust violation on the theory that its sole purpose and effect is to limit competition in the
market for the tied product.31 It is said that the tying represents simply an
attempt to extend monopoly power from the market for the tying product into
the market for the tied product. Probably few other judicially developed theories
in American antitrust law have been subjected to such sustained academic
criticism as the monopoly extension theory of tying.32 The critics point out
that in most cases where the tying and tied products are used together the
monopoly revenues that accrue from controlling the supply of the tying product cannot be increased from a monopolization of the tied product market.
A monopolist who under given demand and cost conditions is maximizing
his profits from the tying product and who then imposes an additional cost
on his customers by obligating them to purchase the tied product from him is
effectively raising the price of - and by definition decreasing the profit earned
from - the tying product. 33 Imposition of the tie raises the price of the tying
product above the profit maximizing level. What is gained on one side is lost
on the other. A theory of tying that has gained wide recognition in lieu of the
monopoly extension theory explains tying in terms of price discrimination. A
monopolist who must set one uniform price for his product (that is, who
cannot charge each potential purchaser of his product exactly what such
purchaser is willing to pay for it), will price the product so as to produce an
output where marginal cost exactly equals marginal revenue. With a price so
chosen, it is inevitable that there are some purchasers of the product who
would have bought it even at a higher price and there are still other would-be
purchasers who are unwilling to pay the monopoly price but would be willing
to pay a lower price, but one still greater than or equal to the marginal cost
of production. With an efficient system of price discrimination, all of these
purchasers can be made to purchase at a price that closely approximates the
full value of the product to them, and the monopolist can thereby increase his

3

1 See infra, notes 100-125 and accompanying text.
= See, e.g., R. Bork, Vertical Integration and The Sherman Act: The Legal History
of an Economic Misconception (1954), 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 157 at 196 n. 129; W. S.
Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem (1957), 67 Yale LJ. 19;
Burstein, supra, note 18; R. S. Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity and The Leverage Theory,
Part 1 (1967), 76 Yale LJ. 1397, Part 11 (1970), 80 Yale L.J. 195; K. C. Dam, Fortner
Enterprises v. United States Steel: "Neither a Borrower nor a Lender Be", [1969] Sup.
Ct. Rev. 1; R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Lmv (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
1972) at 127-28. See generally, D. N. Thompson, Franchise Operations and Antitrust
(Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, Inc., 1969) at 271-94.
33
Bowman, id. at 20-21.
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profits over what they would be at any single price.3 4 This type of price discrimination is probably socially beneficial, for it allows the monopolist "to
expand his total output and to sell to customers who, while valuing the product
above its marginal cost, cannot afford to pay the uniform price which the
monopolist would charge in the absence of price discrimination." 35 Overt price
discrimination in the monopolist's product may be impossible, however, because of the difficulty of identifying the different values attached to the product
by the different users or because of statutes outlawing price discrimination or
because of the difficulty of preventing arbitrageamong the different purchasers.
Where the product in question is used in conjunction with some other product,
such as punch cards with computers3 6 or paper with photocopiers37 or cans
with can-closing machinery,38 tying may be a neat solution to all three problems. The tying product, the product with respect to which there is monopoly
power, may be sold or leased at a price near marginal cost. By insisting that
all punch cards or paper or tin cans to be used with the machinery be purchased from him, the monopolist has a convenient counting or metering device. Through their purchases of the tied product, those persons who use the
tying product most intensively will pay the most for it. 9
Under the price discrimination model, the producer of the tying product
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A monopolist who must charge a single price for his product will set price at P
in Fig. la so as to equate marginal revenue with marginal cost (which has been made
to equal average cost for the sake of simplicity), will produce output A and will earn
profits equal to the rectangle PYXB. In Fig. 1b, if the monopolist were able to engage
in perfect price discrimination he would produce output Al and would earn profits equal
to the triangle DGB. The triangle DGB is larger than the rectangle PYXB.
85 Harv. L. Rev. Note, supra, note 27 at 1728 n.52.
86 International Business Machines Corp. v. United States (1936), 298 U.S. 131.
87
Advance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp. (1969), 415 F. 2d 55
(4th Cir.); cert. denied, (1970), 397 U.S. 920.
88 United States v. American Can. Co. (1949), 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal).
8aThis statement overlooks a subtle assumption upon which the model is based:
that the demand schedules of the individual consumers of the tying product are price
sensitive in inverse proportion to the intensities of their respective uses of the product.
That is, it is assumed that the more intensively a particular consumer uses the tying
product, the less price elastic will be his demand for it.
34
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is not interested in extending his monopoly into the market for the tied product, and indeed he cannot expect to do so for those tied products that have
uses other than in conjunction with the tying product. If the price discrimination model is accepted as accurately describing a substantial number of tying
cases in the real world, then the important policy question is what attitude to
adopt toward the already existing monopoly in the tying product. For example,
the intent behind the patent laws (a source of legitimate monopoly power)
to encourage innovation might be best served by allowing the patentee to
maximize his profits during the life of the patent. This would indicate either
that tying should be tolerated in patent situations or that the law relating to
price discrimination should be rethought. On the other hand, it must be recognized that for those tied products for which there is not a great demand other
than for use in conjunction with the tying product, the effect, if not the intention, of the tying policy will be to extend monopoly into the market for
the tied product and to shut out competing sellers thereof. 40
The price discrimination model, for all its theoretical neatness, must be
approached with some caution because of the numbers of occurrences of tied
selling that it does not explain. It could conceivably explain only those examples where many units of the tied product are consumed in the course of
using the tying product so that the tied product can truly be said to perform
a metering function. It would not give a convincing rationale for the majority
of litigated cases discussed in Part D.3 of this paper infra. In particular, the
price discrimination model does not explain the practices of full-line forcing
and directed buying in the gasoline industry, and therefore tying in that industry may be viewed as a classical extension of power from the market for
petroleum products to the market for non-petroleum automotive products.
In the catalogue of pros and cons of exclusive dealing and tied selling, a
final factor that might be mentioned is a concern to prevent dealers from being
overreached by their suppliers, a concern to maintain dealers' freedom of
action for its own sake. Although a charter of freedom for dealers is doubtless
a worthy legislative goal, this paper has little to say on the topic except as it
relates to the state of competition in the market place, 41 which is the chief
concern of section 31.4 of the Combines Investigation Act.
THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE

C.

Exclusive dealing is defined in section 31.4 of the Combines Investigation
Act to include
(a) any practice whereby a supplier of a product, as a condition of supplying the
product to a customer, requires that customer to
(i) deal only or primarily in products supplied by or designated by the
supplier or his nominee, or
(ii) refrain from dealing in a specified class or kind of product, except as
supplied by the supplier or his nominee,
4

o Supra, note 24 at 63 n. 42.
For example, if we assume that dealers enjoying wider freedom from control
by suppliers would sell different products from the ones they actually sell, that relates
directly to competition, both among dealers and among their suppliers.
41
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and
(b) any practice whereby a supplier of a product induces a customer to meet a
condition set out in subparagraph (a) (i) or (ii) by offering to supply the product
to him on more favourable terms or conditions if the customer agrees to meet
the condition set out in either of those subparagraphs.

Clause (a) of the definition is straightforward enough. The concern is only
with exclusive dealing requirements that amount to a "practice" of the supplier, perhaps because it was not thought that anything short of a practice
could have the effect of substantially lessening competition. On the other hand,
the term "practice" when combined with "requires" avoids any implication
of the formalities of "contract" or the voluntariness of "agreements." The
language "or primarily" was inserted in order to disable suppliers from evading the coverage of the section simply by specifying that some proportion less
than 100 per cent of the customer's requirements must be taken from the
42
supplier or other designated source.
Clause (b) is more troublesome. One of the most frequently asserted
defences of the practice of exclusive dealing is that it reduces suppliers' costs
because it enables them to plan production on the basis of a known demand
and it also reduces their promotional costs. While one may be skeptical as to
both the frequency of occurrence and the quantity of cost savings generated
by exclusive dealing, subclause (b) could be interpreted to discourage suppliers from engaging in schemes to pass on these cost savings, where they
do exist, to their customers. It is appreciated, of course, that exclusive dealing
is not a criminal offense under the Act and that an order against it is not to
be made except where, as a result of it, competition is likely to be substantially
lessened. However, the legislative determination to define a certain practice
as "reviewable" will likely have a 'chilling effect'; it will discourage businessmen from engaging in the practice so that they may safely avoid the possibility
of governmental examination of their affairs. If a dominant supplier of a
product in a market offered a price reduction to customers in return for their
exclusive dealing, and as a result many customers so dealt, it is possible that
the Commission could find that competition had been substantially lessened.
If the price reduction were cost justified, however, the result of a finding of
substantial lessening of competition could be to penalize the efficient firm, to
protect competitors rather than competition.4 3 In its Interim Report on Competition Policy, an early precursor to the present legislation, the Economic
Council of Canada recommended that efficiency should be "the sole objective"
of competition policy. "We are in effect saying that no individual competitor,
corporate or otherwise, has an inherent right to stay in business. '44 The answer
to the possible difficulty created by subclause (b) is that discounts offered
should be based on volume purchased and not on exclusive dealing.
Section 31.4 of the Act defines tied selling to be:
(a) any practice whereby a supplier of a product, as a condition of supplying the
product to a customer, requires that customer to
42

H.C. Committee Proceedings, supra, note 5 at 49:28.
See generally, M. A. Adelman, Integrationand Antitrust Policy (1949), 63 Harv.
L. Rev. 27.
44
Supra, note 8 at 20.
43
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(i) acquire some other product from the supplier or his nominee, or
(ii) refrain from using or distributing, in conjunction with the tying product,
another product that is not of a brand or manufacture designated by the
supplier or his nominee,

and
(b) any practice whereby a supplier of a product induces a customer to meet a
condition set out in subparagraph (a) (i) or (I) by offering to supply the tying
product to him on more favourable terms or conditions if the customer agrees
to meet the condition set out in either of those subparagraphs.

The definition appears to cover comprehensively the various types of tied

selling.45 The same remarks as were made above with respect to exclusive
dealing may be made with respect to cost justified inducements in tied selling.
Exclusive dealing and tied selling are not offenses; they are practices
reviewable by the Commission only - and only upon application of the
Director of Investigation and Research." Where the Director makes such an
application, the statute does not give to the Commission discretion to decline
to review the practice. The question of whether or not the practice sought to
be reviewed does in fact fit within the definition of exclusive dealing or tied
selling goes to the Commission's jurisdiction, and presumably a respondent
can raise it by way of preliminary objection. Every supplier against whom the
Director seeks an order must be given notice and opportunity to be heard,
including opportunity to cross examine witnesses. 47 Before bringing an application for review before the Commission, the Director will presumably have
made use of his broad investigatory powers to construct his case.48 In proceedings before the Commission, the burden of proof is upon the Director.49
The Commission may make an order against the continuation of exclusive dealing or tied selling where it finds that:
First: The practice "is engaged in by a major supplier of a product in a market
or... is widespread in a market"; and
Second: because of the presence of the first factor, the practice "is likely to (a)
impede entry into or expansion of a firm in the market, (b) impede introduction
of a product into or expansion of sales of a product in the market, or (c) have
any other exclusionary effect in the market"; and
Third: because of the presence of the second factor, "competition is or is likely
to be lessened substantially". 50

In all the verbiage, the significant item appears to be the third: that the practice in question does or is likely to substantially lessen competition. The first
factor, it is submitted, is a sine qua non for the third: competition cannot be
lessened substantially by a practice that is neither engaged in by a major
supplier of a product nor widespread in a market. The second factor as well
appears to be of small practical significance: it is difficult to construct an
45
Supra, text
46

following note 7.
Where, however, the Commission after reviewing a practice does make an order
with respect to it, failure to comply with such an order would be an offense under s.
46.1 of The Act.
47 C.I.A., ss. 31.4(2), 31.8(3).
48 C.I.A., ss. 7-13.
49 C.I.A., s. 31.8(2).
50 CJ.A., s. 31.4(2).
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example where the practice of exclusive dealing or of tied selling would substantially lessen competition other than by impeding entry or expansion of
sales of a firm or a product in the market or by having some other exclusionary effect. 51 Thus, it is suggested, the first and second factors are simply basic,
perhaps gratuitous, economics lessons delivered by Parliament for the Commission's edification concerning just how the practices in question could be likely to
result in a substantial lessening of competition. In the writer's opinion, the effect
of section 31.4(2) would be unchanged if it read: "The Commission may make
an order where it finds [include here procedural standards] that exclusive dealing or tied selling lessens competition substantially or is likely to do so."
Where the Commission finds that exclusive dealing or tied selling has
the proscribed effect it may make an order directed to any supplier who has been
given notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard prohibiting such
supplier from engaging in the practice and containing any other requirement
that in the Commission's opinion "is necessary to overcome the effects thereof
in the market or to restore or stimulate competition in the market."
Although the Combines Investigation Act does not provide for any
appeal from orders of the Commission, a supplier against whom the Commission makes an order under the reviewable trade practices sections will
presumably be able to seek review of the order in the Federal Court of Appeal
under section 28 of the Federal Court Act upon the ground that the Commission failed to observe a principle of natural justice or otherwise acted
beyond its discretion, erred in law in making its decision, or based its decision
on an erroneous finding of fact made in52a perverse or capricious manner or
without regard for the material before it.
51

The best example the writer can construct, but not one in which he has much
confidence, is to the following effect: Assume that Firm A manufactures a superior line
of computers and that it has a substantial share of the computer market. Assume further
that it limits the sale or lease of its computers to those users who will agree to use exclusively A-brand punch cards. Assume that there is one other manufacturer of punch
cards, Firm B, which is manufacturing and selling punch cards to capacity, has no desire
to expand, and sells the cards somewhat cheaper than A-brand cards. The users of Abrand computers would purchase B-brand cards if they could, since B-brand cards are
cheaper, but they are prohibited by the tie from doing so. Firm A's tying practice has
substantially lessened competition in the sale of punch cards, since users of the A-brand
computer are an important segment of the total market for computer punch cards, and
they cannot buy from Firm B. However, since B is producing to capacity, it is suffering
no exclusionary effect.
This example, however, is flawed. If B is a normally profitable firm selling cards
at a lower price than A, then it is logical to assume, if production costs for cards of the
two firms are equal, that A is earning a supra-normal profit from its card operations.
If so, then competition theory tells us that there are other firms that would enter this
supra-normally profitable line of business (sales of punch cards to users of the A-brand
computer) but for the fact of being excluded from the card market by A's tying policies.
52 R.S.C. 1970 (2nd supp.) c. 10 (as am. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 1). That the review
provisions of s. 28 are available with respect to orders of the Commission is conceded
both by the Commission's present Chairman and by the Director of Investigation and
Research. J. J. Quinlan, The Restrictive Trade Practices Commission: Its Function and
Duties (1975), 44 Antitrust L.J. 492 at 506; Dep't. of Corporate and Consumer Affairs,
Background Papers to Stage One Competition Policy (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1976)
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1976]

Exclusive Dealing

There are four situations specified in section 31.4(4) of the Act where
the practices of exclusive dealing or tied selling would not be subject to an
order of the Commission. They are listed here, although the implications of
some of the exemptions will be drawn out more fully in the remaining parts
of the paper. First, and probably of most practical importance, neither exclusive dealing nor tied selling is subject to an order of the Commission where
it occurs between or among affiliated firms.5r The definition of 'affiliated' includes the conventional one of common control between the respective firms.
There is, however, an aditional definition that is not the one familiar to corporate and securities lawyers: two firms are affiliated in respect of any agreement
between them
whereby one party grants to the other party the right to use a trade mark or trade
name to identify the business of the grantee, provided
(i) such business is related to the sale or distribution, pursuant to a marketing plan or system prescribed substantially by the grantor, of a multiplicity
of products obtained from competing sources of supply and a multiplicity
of supliers, and
54
(ii) no one product dominates such business

This exemption for franchise systems was introduced by the Government between the second and third readings of Bill C-2 in the House of Commons,"5
apparently in response to the Opposition's constantly reiterated argument that
the effect of section 31.4 would be to destroy franchising, a form of business
organization alleged to be socially desirable because franchisees are small
business owners rather than mere employees of huge companiesY6 Sentiment
was expressed in favour of a flat exemption from the vertical restraint provisions for franchised businesses. 7 The Government took the positions that
an exemption for all firms conducting business by franchising would virtually
read the vertical restraint provisions out of the Act and that, in any event,
most franchise operations would not run afoul of the Act's substantial-lessen53
The statutory wording (s. 31.4(4)) is: "no order made under this section applies
in respect of exclusive dealing ... or tied selling between or among companies, partnerships and sole proprietorships that are affiliated." Suppose, in an example of directed
buying, that a parent corporation makes available to its subsidiary a product manufactured by the parent upon condition that the subsidiary purchase all of its requirements
of some other product from a non-affiliated company. Is the tied selling between affiliated
companies? The answer, it is submitted, is yes; the important affiliation is between the
firm imposing the obligation and the firm upon which the obligation is imposed.
54
C.LA., s. 31.4 (5) (c). This franchise exemption for exclusive dealing and tied
selling should not be confused with s. 31.4(7) of the Act, exempting from reviewability
geographic and customer market restrictions in the fast food and soft drink franchise
businesses.
55
Can. H.C. Debates (Oct. 16, 1975) at 8278.
56H.C. Committee Proceedings, supra, note 5 at 50:8-10, 24-25; 51:16; 52:20-23,
27-31; 53:7-8; 55:89-98. The term "franchising" indicates a pattern of contractual relationships whereby a firm, the franchisor, which has developed a pattern or formula
for the manufacture and sale of a product, extends to other firms, the franchisees, the
right to engage in the business, using the trademark or trade name of the franchisor,
subject to certain restrictions and controls. See generally, Thompson, supra, note 32 at
10-26; J. T. McCarthy, Trademark Franchisingand Antitrust: The Trouble with Tie-ins
(1970), 58 Calif. L. Rev. 1085 at 1088-89.
57 -. C. Committee Proceedings, supra, note 5 at 50:9-10; 52:27-28; 53:7-8;

55:89-98.
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ing-of-competition standard."8 Eventually the Government relented and introduced the amendment that is now section 31.4(5) (c). The main interpretive
problem with the exemption is with the word "obtained" in "obtained from
competing sources of supply." Obtained by whom - by the franchisor, the
franchisee, or either one? In the debates, section 31.4(5) (c) was referred
to as the IGA exemption, but its applicability to operations such as IGA is in
fact unclear. 9 While IGA franchised grocers typically sell a multiplicity of
products, no one of which is dominant, obtained from competing sources of
supply, the obtaining is done not by the grocers themselves but by the franchisor. In the arrangements that are common between oil companies and brandname service stations, the exemption would not be available both because the
various products sold are not obtained, either by the companies or by the
stations, from a multiplicity of suppliers and because one product - gasoline
does dominate the business.

Of the three remaining exemptions, one relates to exclusive dealing only
and two to tied selling only. Exclusive dealing is not subject to an order where
it is "engaged in only for a reasonable period of time to facilitate entry of a
new supplier of a product into a market or of a new product into a market." 60
Tied selling is not subject to an order where it "is reasonable having regard
to the technological relationship between or among the products to which it
applies."' Finally, "tied selling that is engaged in by a person in the business
of lending money for the purpose of better securing loans made by him and
is reasonably necessary for such purpose" is not subject to an order.6 2 The
rationale for this exemption for financial institutions is not clear from the
legislative history, but its purpose may be to leave banks free to require their
borrowing customers to maintain compensating balances in non-interest bearing (that is, chequing) accounts with the lending bank or otherwise to conduct
their banking business with the lending bank. Such a specific exemption might
be felt to be necessary since the "products" of which section 31.4 speaks include both articles and services.6
Having considered at least briefly the words chosen by Parliament to
express its concern with the practices under discussion, and some of the
sources of that concern, we turn next to the American law, which provides by
far the largest body of relevant decisions and legal commentary.
D. EXCLUSIVE DEALING AND TIED SELLING UNDER U.S. LAW
Exclusive Dealing in the Courts
If there is a leading case in the law of exclusive dealing, it is doubtless
Standard Oil Company of Californiav. United States (the Standard Stations
1.

is H.C. Committee Proceedings, supra, note 5 at 50:9-10; 52:28; 55:90.
69 Senate Committee Proceedings,supra, note 6 at 69:10-11.
00 C.I.A., s. 31.4 (4) (a). Since the standard for the issuance of an order is substantial lessening of competition, one would have expected this exemption to have developed from the Commission's jurisprudence even in the absence of statutory command.
01

C.I.A., s. 31.4(4) (b).

62

C.I.A., s. 31.4(4) (c).
C.LA., s. 2.

63
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case), decided in the Supreme Court. 4 The Standard Oil Company of California was the largest marketer of gasoline in the "Western area" of the
United States - a seven state region which the court took to be the relevant
geographic market. Under exclusive dealing agreements with about 6,000
independent service stations (comprising 16 percent of the retail service stations in the area), Standard sold 6.8 percent of the total gasoline sold in the
area. 5 Most of the outlets were bound to deal exclusively with Standard for
petroleum products only, although some contracts covered t.b.a. as well. 66
The case was decided under section 3 of the Clayton Act, which provides
in relevant part that
It shall be unlawful for any person... to lease or make a sale or contract for
sale of goods... or fix a price charged therefor... on the condition, agreement
or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the
goods ...

of a competitor ...

of the lessor or seller, where the effect ...

be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly....67

may

The court, affirming the trial court, held that Standard's contracts violated
section 3 and that the requirement of showing that the effect of the agreements
"may be to substantially lessen competition" is satisfied by proof that a substantial portion of commerce is affected. 8 It was not necessary "to show that
competitive activity has actually diminished or probably will diminish" over
what it would be in the absence of exclusive dealing. 69 Amplifying its holding,
the court stated:
[Tihe qualifying clause of §3 is satisfied by proof that competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected. It cannot be gainsaid that observance by a dealer of his requirements contract with Standard does
effectively foreclose whatever opportunity there might be for competing suppliers
to attract his patronage, and it is clear that the affected proportion of retail sales
of petroleum products is substantial.70
The court espoused a test of simple quantitative substantiality as sufficient
for illegality under section 3 notwithstanding that in fact Standard had not
increased its share of the market during the time it employed the exclusive
dealing contracts; that the duration of the contracts was "not excessive"; that
Standard could not by itself be said to dominate the market; and that exclusive
64

Supra, note 25.

65 "Independent" as used by the court meant not company-owned. Outlets owned
by Standard accounted for another 6.8% of total sales, and sales to industrial users for
9.5%. Standard thus accounted for 23% of the total gasoline gallonage sold in the
Western area. It is not clear from the opinion whether the company-owned stations were
company-operated or lessee-operated or both.
06
The opinion focuses upon the former type of contracts. The latter contracts,
covering t.b.a., are characterized as tying contracts (supra, note 25 at 305 n. 8), and,
from the Courts discussion of the law of tying contracts (id. at 304-06), it is reasonably
clear that the t.b.a. contracts would have been held illegal per se, had their particular
status been at issue.
67 15 U.S.C. § 14.
68 Supra, note 25 at 299, 314. About 60 million dollars worth of petroleum products
were sold by Standard under exclusive dealing contracts.
69 Id.
70 d. at 314.
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dealing contracts could be of advantage to buyers as well as sellers. 71 The trial
court, whose judgment was affirmed, had declined to consider evidence proffered by the defendant on the economic merits of these particular exclusive
dealing contracts and on the flourishing state of competition in the industry.72
The Supreme Court said that "serious difficulties" would attend the attempt
to apply tests that as a matter of economic reasoning would be relevant to the
actual effect of the contracts on the state of competition in the industry.7 3 For
one thing, since all of Standard's major competitors were also using exclusive
dealing contracts, having introduced them at about the same time as Standard,
at the end of whatever investigation might be made "it would not be farfetched
to infer that their effect has been to enable the established suppliers individually to maintain their own standing and at the same time collectively, even
though not collusively, to prevent a late arrival from wresting away more than
an insignificant proportion of the market."7 4
Secondly, the court said, an investigation into the actual anticompetitive
effects of a given practice would involve a standard of proof "most ill-suited
for ascertainment by courts" - although not for specialized tribunals like the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), whose concurrent jurisdiction the court
noted.7 5 In this respect, of course, the Clayton Act is to be contrasted with
section 31.4 of the Combines Investigation Act, which gives sole jurisdiction
over exclusive dealing and tied selling to a specialized tribunal.70 The role of
the specialized tribunal as opposed to the generalist court is taken up more
fully below.
71

Id. at 306-09.

72 Id.at 298-99.
78 Id. at
74 Id.at

308.
309.

75 Id.at 310. The FTC, through agency adjudication, and the Department of Justice,

through injunctive actions in the federal courts, share enforcement responsibility for the
Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 21, 25. In addition, the FTC has exclusive authority to
enforce s. 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45, declaring unlawful
"unfair methods of competition in commerce"), subject to court review of its "cease
and desist" orders. Indirectly, the FTC has enforcement power with respect to ss. 1
(combinations in restraint of trade) and 2 (monopolization) of the Sherman Act (15
U.S.C. §§ 1, 2) because the Supreme Court has held that any practices violative of the
Sherman Act can be proceeded against by the Commission under s. 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. Fashion OriginatorsGuild of America Inc. v. FTC (1941), 312
U.S. 457; FTC v. Cement Institute (1948), 333 U.S. 683.
76 Dissenting in Standard Stations (supra, note 25 at 322), Mr. Justice Jackson
found it "unfortunate" that the Clayton Act "submits economic issues to judicial determination." See also Lockhart and Sacks, supra, note 20 at 942. The Attorney General's Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws rejected the notion that all antitrust functions should be transferred from the Department of Justice to the Commission, Report
of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws (Washington
D.C., 1955), at 375, and any movement in such direction appears exceedingly unlikely
now, granted U.S. political and academic disenchantment with the performance of the
regulatory agencies generally and the FTC in particular. See authorities cited infra,

note 202.
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In his famous dissent in StandardStations, Mr. Justice Douglas predicted
that the practical effect of the majority's judgment would be to encourage the
large oil companies to integrate vertically by merger, if they were foreclosed
from doing so by contract, thus turning the auto service station industry from
an industry of small proprietors into an industry of clerks. 77 While conceding
that an industry regime characterized by exclusive dealing contracts is far from
ideal from either the dealers' or the nation's point of view, Mr. Justice Douglas
saw the alternative as far worse.78 This is a matter for some concern in the
Canadian context, where agreements among affiliates are exempt from section
31.4, and a law controlling mergers is probably some years off.79
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion, which seemed to lay down
a rule of per se illegality for exclusive dealing arrangements where "a substantial portion of commerce is affected", was greeted with a torrent of adverse
comment.80 The main body of the criticism, while not unsympathetic to the
court's view that wide-ranging economic investigations were beyond the competence of the judiciary, insisted that since the legislature had banned only
some exclusive dealing arrangements - those likely to lessen competition
substantially - some investigation of likely effects of a particular arrangement
would have to be made. It was hard to see how, without flying in the face of
the legislative intent, the judiciary, by ritualistic deprecation of its own sphere
of competence, could turn the fact that an arrangement affected a substantial
7

7Supra, note 25 at 315. In 1950, one year after the Standard Stations case,
Congress strengthened s. 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 18), dealing with mergers,
to cover asset acquisitions as well as share acquisitions. See, Brown Shoe Co. Inc. v. United
States (1962), 370 U.S. 294. After the Standard Stations decision, the Standard Oil
Company did not in fact engage in a policy of buying up its former customers and turning them into employees. But it did resort increasingly to the consignment or agency
device for distribution of its product. F. Kessler and R. H. Stem, Competition, Contract
and Vertical Integration (1959), 69 Yale L.J. 1 at 38-39. See also Thompson, supra, note
32 at 399. There is reason to believe, however, that in recent years company-owned and
operated outlets have become increasingly important as compared with lessee-operated
and independently owned outlets both in Canada (supra, note 5) and in the U.S. (Antitrust & Trade Reg. L. Rept'r., Washington D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, July 1,
1975 at A-23).
78The Douglas dissent is a classic elegy to the virtues of the small businessman.
It is as much a document of American political sociology as of antitrust law. In the
romantic, despairing prose, the small entrepreneur is hailed as an endangered species,
a sort of twentieth century noble savage.
79
The Government has recently published the proposals of an independent committee of consultants to the Minister of Corporate and Consumer Affairs relating to Stage
II changes in Canadian combines law, Dynamic Change and Accountability in a Canadian Market Economy (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1976). The matter of mergers will be
taken up as part of the Stage II amendments.
80
See, e.g., M. Handler, Antitrust in Perspective (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1957) at 33-42; L. B. Schwartz, Potential Impairment of Competition - The
Impact of Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States on the Standard of Legality
Under the Clayton Act (1950), 98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 10; A.G. Committee, supra, note 76
at 141-49; Lockhart and Sacks, supra, note 20.
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portion of commerce into the conclusion that competition had been foreclosed
in so much commerce as was affected."'
By the time of its next full-dress hearing of an exclusive dealing case,
Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,8 2 the Supreme Court seemed to
have backed away from the quantitative substantiality test. Tampa, an electric
utility, had agreed to purchase from Nashville, a coal producer, all of its requirements of coal for generating plants in Florida over a 20-year period. The
value of coal involved was to have been not less than $128 million. (Thus,
the contract was of much longer duration than those in StandardStations and
involved twice the dollar volume). Before deliveries were to have begun,
Nashville reneged, and in the ensuing litigation it defended on the ground that
the requirements contract was illegal under section 3 of the Clayton Act. This
argument was sustained in the lower courts, largely on the basis of Standard
Stations. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that "a mere showing that the
contract itself involves a substantial number of dollars is ordinarily of little
consequence."83 What was more significant was the volume of commerce involved in the contract as a proportion of the total volume of commerce in the
relevant product and geographic markets. Taking the product market as coal,
the market foreclosed was to be defined not with reference to the purchaser's
location but rather with reference to the total coal production in that region
where the defendant Nashville produced: the eight state region known roughly
as Appalachia. The relevant market foreclosure is that suffered by the producer's actual and putative competitors. So construed, the particular contract
81
Inthe writer's view, the most cogently expressed criticism of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion was that of the Attorney General's Committee, id. at 146-47 (emphasis
in source):
The central inquiry, we believe, is whether a system of challenged exclusive arrangements in fact "forecloses" competitors from a substantial market. It is, of
course, elementary that every bilateral contract for the sale of goods correspondingly prevents third parties from getting that business, and to this extent excludes
a rival's trade. Hence an exclusive arrangement may be no more restrictive than
an ordinary mercantile agreement; a flexible short-term requirements contract, for
example, may leave greater opportunities to rivals than an absolute sale of a large
quantity which would fill the buyer's needs for a longer time.

In our view, the mere coverage of a substantial volume of commerce by exclusive
dealing arrangements, while a factor to be considered, is not tantamount to "foreclosure" of rivals from access to a substantial market, so that some analysis of
particular distributive patterns is essential to any determination of actual foreclosure.
82
Supra, note 21. The court had dealt with exclusive dealing in two cases between
Standard Stations and Tampa: in FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co. Inc.
(1953), 344 U.S. 392, it upheld as supported by substantial evidence the Commission's
finding that certain long-term exclusive dealing contracts constituted an unfair method of
competition under s. 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act; in Richfield Oil Corp. v.
United States (1952), 343 U.S. 922, it affirmed per curiam the judgment of the trial
court that the oil company's exclusive dealing and full line forcing practices were illegal
under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The Supreme Court's opinion was limited to
citation of Standard Stations.
85
Supra, note 21 at 329.
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foreclosed substantially less than one percent of the total coal market. The
court did not find such foreclosure to be substantial:
There is here neither a seller with a dominant position in the market, nor myriad
outlets with substantial sales volume, coupled with an industry wide practice of
relying upon exclusive contracts, nor a plainly restrictive tying arrangement. On
the contrary, we seem to have only that type of contract
which may well be of
84
economic advantage to buyers as well as to sellers.

The particular advantage to the buyer here, a public utility, was the assurance
of a steady and ample supply of fuel so that customers would not be exposed
either to service failures owing to shut downs or to constantly escalating rates.8
Shortly after its decision in Tampa, the Supreme Court, in reviewing
section 3 of the Clayton Act and in an apparent attempt to reconcile Tampa
with Standard Stations, cited Tampa for the proposition that
a requirement contract may escape censure if only a small share of the market is
involved, if the purpose of the agreement is to insure to the customer a sufficient
supply of a commodity vital to the customer's trade or to insure to the supplier
a market for his output and if there is no trend toward concentration in the
industry. 8 6

2.

Exclusive Dealing and the FTC

Despite the quite sharp distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in
Standard Stations between the type of economic inquiry into the actual competitive effect of a given practice that could suitably be undertaken by a court
and what could be undertaken by a specialized tribunal such as the FTC, the
latter body eventually came to deal with exclusive dealing under a per se
quantitative substantiality test.
In the first exclusive dealing case to come before it after Standard Stations, the Commission did indeed take the position that it should make the
full scale inquiry into actual anti-competitive effects that the Supreme Court
had abjured. In The Maico Company, Inc.87 the hearing examiner had excluded from the record certain evidence relating to the effect on competition
of the exclusive dealing provisions in the respondent's contracts with distributors of its hearing aids. The examiner found a violation of section 3 solely
on the bases of the large absolute amount of business done by the respondent
under such contracts and the respondent's relative position in the industry.
The full Commission reversed and remanded to the hearing examiner to
receive the respondents proffered evidence.
We believe the structure of the Federal Trade Commission was specifically de84 Id. at 334.
85
It may be doubted whether adequate protection of the public interest really
required a 20-year requirements contract since, when Nashville reneged, Tampa found
no shortage of suppliers waiting and anxious to step into the breach: see, Bok, supra,
note 20 at 284.
86Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra, note 77 at 330-3 1. It is to be noted that
there are three separate factors here: small market share affected and no trend toward
concentration and a purpose to ensure either a source of supply to the customer or an
outlet to the supplier.
87 (1953), 50 FTC 485.
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signed to make decisions involving this type of complex economic problem. To
refuse to exercise our talents as an administrative tribunal in these cases because
the courts feel "ill suited" to weigh all of the relevant factors, would deprive the
country of the very services which we were created to furnish. 88

But by 1960, some seven years after Maico, the Commission had changed
its view. In Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.89 the hearing examiner had found
that the exclusive dealing contracts between the respondent, a marketer of a
vitamin-mineral food supplement, and its door-to-door distributors violated
section 3, solely on the evidentiary bases of the respondent's large share of
the relevant market and the large number of distributors involved. The hearing
examiner had declined to consider certain economic evidence relating to the
respondent's constantly declining market share and to the low cost that competitors would face in establishing their own systems of distributors. The
Commission affirmed the hearing examiner and announced that it would no
longer follow its earlier expressed views in Maico as to the relevancy of economic evidence because "since the date of the Commission's action in the
Maico case, the courts have made it clear that in a situation such as that
shown to exist in this record, the plain language of Section 3 makes irrelevant
those economic considerations urged by respondents." 90
In Canda, where jurisdiction over exclusive dealing and tied selling will
lie solely in the RTPC, it should be clear enough that all economic evidence
going to the issue of a practice's actual or likely effect upon competition will
be relevant, indeed, of the essence. However, the views of the American FTC
in Mytinger & Casselberryand the judicial decisions relied upon therein reveal
a confusion that could, in the absence of care, creep into Canadian proceedings: that is, a failure to distinguish between evidence going to the issue of
the presence or absence of substantial anti-competitive effect, actual or likely,
and evidence attempting to show a business justification for a practice found
to be substantially anti-competitive. Evidence of the first type must be received; evidence of the second type is correctly excluded unless it tends to
establish one of the legislatively created defenses, for example, in Canada,
new supplier, affiliation and technological relationship. The tribunal's role is
to assess anti-competitive effects, not to forgive them. 9 '
The distinction between the two types of evidence is illustrated both by
Mytinger & Casselberry itself, and by the cases therein relied upon by the
Commission as authorities for rejecting all economic evidence. In Mytinger &
Casselberry the matters of respondent's declining market share and the low
cost of establishing distributorships are clearly relevant to the question of
anti-competitive effect.
In Anchor Serum Co.,92 evidence was proffered, and rejected, to the
effect that the exclusive dealing contracts were necessary to protect the
88 Id. at 488.
89 (1960), 57 FTC 717.
90

Id.at 741. The Commission's view was in turn affirmed by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, (1962), 301 F. 2d 534, over the dissent of Judge,
now Chief Justice, Burger.
01 Cf., A.G. Committee, supra, note 76 at 148.
02 (1954), 50 FTC 681, affd., 217 F. 2d 867 (7th Cir.).

1976]

Exclusive Dealing

"Anchor" trade name, since some of Anchor's distributors were contractually
entitled to use "Anchor Serum" as part of their names. Rejection of the evidence on this point was probably correct since, as the Court of Appeals
pointed out, judicial creation of such a defense would mean that, irrespective
of its effect upon competition, any exclusive dealing arrangement could be
justified by including in the contract a privilege for the purchaser to use the
trade name of the seller. 93 The other evidence rejected in Anchor Serum related to the respondent's claim that in many cases the impetus for exclusive
dealing contracts came not from it but from the distributors, who wanted to
have an assured source of supply. In affirming the Commission, the court
stated that so long as there was, in the words of section 3, a "condition,
agreement or understanding" for exclusive dealing which had the proscribed
effect upon competition, it was of no concern whether buyer or seller had
instigated the arrangement. "We think it is a novel theory that the rights,
liabilities and obligations of parties to a contract depend upon which of the
parties propose it." 94
Suppose that under the Combines Investigation Act a dealer in or user
of a product wishes to obtain an assured source of supply. Surely it would
be a rare supplier who would agree to accept an absolute obligation to stand
ready always to meet a customer's requirements without demanding in return
that the customer deal exclusively for such product with that supplier. The
result in such a case would be, to paraphrase the language of section 31.4(1),
that the supplier would induce the customer to deal exclusively with that
supplier by offering the goods on particularly favourable conditions - that
is, assuring the customer that all of its requirements of the product will be
filled. As a result, Canadian law may be expected to follow Anchor Serum
in this regard.
In Dictograph Products, Inc.,95 the rejected evidence was again of two
types. The first was designed to show that the technological theory underlying
the respondent's hearing aids was different from that of its competitors' hearing aids, and that therefore respondent had to insist upon exclusive dealing
from its distributors in order that its product be properly presented to the
public. Evidence of this sort of "business necessity" justification, of which
there was no mention in the Clayton Act, 6 was quite properly rejected since
93 217 F. 2d at 871. There is not in the Clayton Act, or in the Combines Investigation Act, any defence to exclusive dealing for the protection of a trade name. But see,
Susser v. CarvelCorp. (1964), 332 F. 2d 505 at 516-17 (2nd Cir.), cert. dismissed, (1965),
381 U.S. 125. See also, infra, notes 135-37, 194-95, 207-09 and accompanying text.
94217 F. 2d at 870.
95 (1953), 50 FTC 281, aff'd. (1954), 217 F. 2d 821 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied,
(1955), 349 U.S. 940.
96
Infact there are no defences written into s. 3 of the Clayton Act, as there are
ins. 31.4 of the C.I.A. However, some of the same defences as appear in the Canadian
statute would in practice also be available under the American one. If a producer and
a distributor are affiliated, for example, (C.I.A., s. 31.4 (4)), then there will probably
be absent a purchase or lease between the parties, necessary to bring s. 3 of the Clayton
Act into play. Where a new supplier engages in exclusive dealing for only a "reasonable
period", then it is hard to see how the effect could be to "substantially lessen competition." As for the technological relationship defence to tied selling in the U.S., see,
infra, notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
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it will almost always be true, ceteris paribus, that exclusive dealing produces
more effective marketing of the product exclusively dealt in. The other evidence rejected, however, was to the effect that during the time the respondent
had engaged in exclusive dealing its competitors in the manufacture of hearing
aids had increased from twenty to eighty. Exclusion of this evidence clearly
was wrong, since it is hard to see what could be more relevant to the effect
of a practice upon
competition than a sharp increase or decrease in the number
7
of competitors.
Whatever the logical merits of the FTC's decision to exclude economic
evidence and to follow a rule of per se illegality where a substantial amount
of the relevant market was tied up in exclusive dealing arrangements, the
decision to proceed in this way was probably a legal necessity so long as court
and Commission were to have concurrent jurisdiction over section 3 enforcement. For it was clear from the Supreme Court's Standard Stations opinion
how the federal trial courts were to approach exclusive dealing, and if the Commission were to have persisted in approaching it differently, that is with greater
economic sophistication, then the result might have been different standards of
legality for the same practice depending on whether it was litigated before a
court or the Commission.98 While the Commission might have continued to
consider all economically relevant factors on the assumption that the Tampa
Electriccase represented an abandonment by the Supreme Court of its extreme
anti-economic evidence position in StandardStations, that is not what happened.
In affirming the FTC in Mytinger & Casselberry, the Court of Appeals took
StandardStations as the guide post and distinguished Tampa Electric on the
basis of the small per centage of the relevant product market there involved. 99
There has not been very substantial development of exclusive dealing doctrine
in either the courts or the Commission after Tampa Electric. The Commission
has been fairly active in its enforcement efforts against exclusive dealing, but
the vast majority of complaints have resulted in consent decrees.
3.

Tied Selling

The law of tied selling in the United States has developed under two
statutory provisions, section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits contracts,
combinations and conspiracies "in restraint of trade",100 and Section 3 of the
Clayton Act.10g Because Section 3 of the Clayton Act relates only to "commodities", its specific language directed at tied selling has not availed in all
97
Compare, Harley-DavidsonMotor Co. (1954), 50 FTC 1047, where the respondent was one of two American manufacturers of motorcycles and the proof was that
shortly after Harley's initiation of an exclusive dealing policy, its only domestic competitor, which was much smaller than Harley, was virtually driven out of the motorcycle
business because of inability to obtain outlets.
98
See, Bok, supra, note 20 at 305-06; A.G. Committee, supra, note 76 at 148.
90
Supra, note 90 at 539.
100 15 U.S.C. § 1. By judicial gloss, the literal words have been narrowed to reach
only "unreasonable" restraints of trade. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States
(1958), 356 U.S. 1; Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States (1911), 221 U.S.
1; Chicago Board of Trade v. United States (1918), 246 U.S. 231.
1o Supra, text accompanying note 67.
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cases, and resort has frequently been had to the more general provisions of
the Sherman Act. 0 2 Under Section 3 of the Clayton Act the Supreme Court
has developed a rule of virtual per se illegality: a tied selling arrangement is
illegal whenever it covers a substantial volume of commerce in the tied
product. 0 3 This simple rule has been developed because, in the court's view,
"[t]ying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition" in the market for the tied product. 04 The requirement of substantiality can be satisfied either in absolute dollar terms - $500,000 worth of salt
was enough in InternationalSalt Co. v. United States0 5 - or in terms of the
proportion of the market for the tied product that is affected.' 06 The threshby the court
hold of substantiality is indeed a low one, having been equated
07

with "not insubstantial", not "de minimis" and "not paltry."'

Under the more general language of section 1 of the Sherman Act, a tying
arrangement will be illegal only if unreasonable; it will be unreasonable per se
if the defendant has a dominant position in the market for the tying product
and a substantial volume of commerce in the tied product is restrained. 0 8 The
requisite dominance in the tying product market will always be present where
the tying product is itself patented'0 9 or subject to copyright" or is inherently
unique - as land."' Even if tying challenged under the Sherman Act is not
per se unlawful, (as where the requisite tying product dominance is absent),
102 Of the nine cases in the Supreme Court of the United States involving the legality

of tied selling under the antitrust laws (as opposed to the question whether a tying seller
can sue for patent infringement of the tying device), five have arisen under the Sherman
Act, three under the Clayton Act and one under both statutes. Sherman Act cases:
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp. (1969), 394 U.S. 495; United
States v. Loew's Inc. (1962), 371 U.S. 38; Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States,
supra, note 100; Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States (1953), 345 U.S. 594;
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. (1948), 334 U.S. 131. Clayton Act cases:
International Business Machines Corp. v. United States (1936), 298 U.S. 131; FTC v.
Sinclair Refining Co. (1923), 261 U.S. 463; United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United
States (1922), 258 U.S. 451. International Salt Co., Inc. v. United States (1947), 332
U.S. 392 was brought under both statutes.
103 International Salt, id.; see, Times-Picayune Publishing Co., id. at 608-09.
104 Standard Stations, supra,note 25 at 305-06.
-o5 Supra, note 102.
100 See, Fortner Enterprises,supra, note 102 at 501-02.
107Id.
108 Times-Picayune Publishing Co., supra, note 102 at 608-09.
109 InternationalSalt, supra, note 102. Furthermore, the conclusive finding of dominance is not negatived by the fact that there are many substitutes available for the
patented product. Northern Pacific, supra, note 100 at 9; Fortner Enterprises, supra,
note 102 at 503-05.
110 U.S. v. Loew's, supra, note 102; U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, supra, note 102.
111 Northern Pacific, supra, note 100. A trademark, however, will not necessarily
confer the requisite dominance upon the tying product. Capital Temporaries Inc. of
Hartfordv. Olsten Corp. (1974), 506 F. 2d 658 at 663 (2nd Cir.); Susser v. Carvel Corp.
supra,note 93 at 519. Contra:Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc. (1971), 448 F. 2d 43 at 4950, cert. denied, (1972) 405 U.S. 955. A trademark, as opposed to a patent or a
copyright, does not confer upon its owner the right to prevent copying of the product
subject to the mark but gives him only the right not to have the mark itself misappropriated.
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it may still be illegal under general Sherman Act standards relating to illegal
purpose or effect of a challenged arrangement. 1 2
Since section 31.4 of the Combines Investigation Act covers both "articles" and "services" and since "articles" are defined comprehensively in
section 2 of the Act as "real and personal property of every description", the
Canadian law of tied selling can develop along a unitary path, rather than the
bifurcated one that has characterized U.S. developments. And if the RTPC
takes as negative a view of the merits of tied selling as does the U.S. Supreme
Court, then eventually the rule in Canada could come to look much like the
American Clayton Act rule: tied selling would be found to be likely to lead
to a substantial lessening of competition wherever a substantial amount of
commerce in the tied product was involved. The writer would not consider
the emergence in Canada of such a per se rule as either unlikely or inappropriate simply because the practice has been committed to the jurisdiction of a
specialized tribunal. It would, however, appear remarkable for such a rule to
emerge very early in the Commission's tied selling proceedings and before the
Commission had had some experience in considering the phenomenon.
The question of dominance in the American Sherman Act proceedings
is worth some consideration in the context of the Combines Investigation Act,
however, because in the absence of tying product dominance it is doubtful
that tied selling can exist or, at any rate, that its effect upon competition could
be substantial. 113 The purpose of a tying arrangement is to induce the purchaser to purchase the tied product in circumstances where, in the absence
of the agreement, he would not do so."14 If the same amount of the tied
product would be consumed in the absence of the tying arrangement as with it,
that is, if the tied product would sell equally well on its own unaided merits,
then no effect has been achieved by the arrangement other than possible alienation of some of the prospective consumers of the tying device." 5 The consumer agrees to alter his purchasing pattern in the tied product from what his
self-interest would otherwise dictate simply because the tying product has
112

Fortner Enterprises, supra, note 102 at 500; Times-Picayune Publishing Co.,

supra, note 102 at 614.
I'8 As Mr. Justice Black stated in Northern Pacific, supra, note 100 at 6:
[Where the seller has no control or dominance over the tying product so that it
does not represent an effectual weapon to pressure buyers into taking the tied
item any restraint of trade attributable to such tying arrangements would obviously
be insignificant at most.
114 In recognition of those cases (like Northern Pacific, id. at 3) where the obligation to purchase the tied product is conditional upon better price or other terms not
being available elsewhere, perhaps the phrase "might not do so" would be more accurate
in the text. These types of tying arrangements can be anti-competitive in their effect
since the tying seller is obligated merely to meet its competitors' terms to keep the
business in question, while the competitors must beat the tying seller's terms to get the
business for themselves. See, InternationalSalt, supra, note 102 at 397.
115 A private plaintiff seeking treble damages who cannot show that he was "coerced" by the tying arrangement into making a purchase of the tied product where he
would not otherwise have done so cannot succeed. American Manufacturers' Mutual
Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-ParamountTheatres Inc. (1971), 446 F. 2d 1131
(2nd Cir.), cert. denied, (1972), 404 U.S. 1063; Capital Temporaries v. Olsten, supra,
note 111; Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc. (1976), 531 F. 2d 1211 (3rd Cir.).
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some particular appeal for him. When the onus of the obligation to purchase
the tied product is subtracted from the appeal of the tying product, the result
is still better for the purchaser than doing without the tying product. That is
what dominance in the tying product means. In Northern Pacific Railway Co.
v. United States, the court stated that the very existence of tying arrangements

is compelling evidence of a defendant's "great power" in the market for the
tying product, at least in the absence of some other explanation, 116 and the
circle was closed completely when the Court explained that the requisite
amount of "dominance" was that amount "sufficient... to impose an appreciable restraint on free competition in the tied product."' 1 7 In other words,
the test for per se illegality under the8 Sherman Act was really one and the
same as that under the Clayton Act."
By the time of its most recent tying case, Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v.
United States Steel Corp.," 9 the Supreme Court was still espousing economic
power in the tying product market and restraint of a substantial volume of
commerce in the tied product market as separate elements of Sherman Act
per se illegality, and the result was confusion all around. In Fortner Enterprises, a private treble damage action, the plaintiff was the owner of a large
tract of land near Louisville, Kentucky, suitable for residential development.
The defendant Steel Company was anxious to market the prefabricated steel
homes manufactured by its Homes Division. The defendant approched the
plaintiff with a plan whereby the plaintiff would erect the defendant's prefabricated homes on the building lots, and the defendant's Credit Corporation
subsidiary would extend to the plaintiff on favourable terms credit to finance
110 Northern Pacific, supra. note 100 at 8.
17Id. at 6, 11.
118 See, Note: The Logic of Foreclosure:Tie-in Doctrine After Fortner v. U.S. Steel
(1969), 79 Yale L.J. 86 at 90. In private actions, however, the courts of appeals have
continued to demand a separate showing of dominance in the tying product as an
element of per se illegality of tied selling under the Sherman Act. Susser v. Carvel,
supra, note 93 at 518-21; Capital Temporaries Inc. v. Olsten, supra, note 111 at 663;
Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts, supra, note 115 at 1224; Smith v. Scrivener-Roogaart,Inc.
(1971), 447 F. 2d 1014 at 1017 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, (1972), 404 U.S. 1059.
The broad availability of private, treble damage actions (Clayton Act s. 4, 15 U.S.C.
§15) especially when combined with the class action device (Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 23)
has caused the lower courts at times to be more conservative (pro-defendant) in applying the antitrust laws in private actions than is the Supreme Court in government-instituted enforcement actions. See, e.g., Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts, supra, note 115 at
1222-26. Cf. M. Handler, The Inevitability of Risk Taking in Antitrust (1975), 9
Georgia L. Rev. *743 at 753:
Concomitantly with [the explosion in antitrust litigation] has come the increased
use of the class action device . . . A class action of many thousands or indeed
millions of class members, based upon novel restraints found unlawful in government action after years of litigation can now confront a defendant with claims
running into the hundreds of millions if not billions of dollars. This produces a
risk factor of incalculable proportions.
In Canada, the private action arising out of exclusive dealing and tied selling is by
comparison quite restricted. It is available only where the RTPC makes an order against
the practice and the order is violated, thus causing injury to the plaintiff, C.I.A. s. 31.1
(1)(b).
119 Supra, note 102.
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the purchase and construction of the homes and the development of the lots. An
agreement embodying the understandings was entered into, the credit was extended and the development proceeded. Eventually the plaintiff-developer ran
into serious financial difficulties, allegedly due in the main to the defective
quality of the homes, and the litigation followed. The theory of the plaintiff's
case was that the defendant had illegally tied the availability of its credit to
purchase of its prefabricated homes. The case reached the Supreme Court
on appeal from a summary judgment in favour of the defendant.
The court, in a five-to-four split, reversed and remanded for trial. The
majority, per Mr. Justice Black, held that the uncontroverted facts indeed
made out a tying case and that the amount of commerce in the tied product,
the houses, affected by the arrangement was substantial. The case was remanded for trial on the issue of the Steel Company's power in the market
for the tying product - credit.120 In the dissenters' view,121 this was really
not a tying case at all, unless a commodity could be said to be tied to its own
price. What was being sold was one item, prefabricated steel homes, and not
two. 22 The dissenters saw the cheap credit simply as a form of price competition in the sale of the homes themselves, and, of course, encouragement
of price competition is a policy close to the heart of antitrust law. Mr. Justice
Fortas concluded with respect to the applicability of tying doctrine:
To apply this rule to a situation where the only "leverage" is a lower price for the
120 Upon remand, the trial court entered a directed verdict for the plaintiff. The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, (1971), 452 2d 1095, cert. denied,
(1972), 406 U.S. 919, holding that the defendant was entitled to have submitted to a
jury the issue of United States Steel Credit Corporation's power in the credit market as
compared with other sources of credit in the Louisville area. Upon the second remand
to the district court, the parties agreed that the question of the defendant's power in the
credit market should be submitted to the judge, sitting without a jury. The trial judge
found for the plaintiff, and this time the Court of Appeals affirmed. (1975), 523 F. 2d
961, cert. granted, (1976), 96 S. Ct. 1100. At the time of writing (December, 1976),
the Supreme Court has heard oral argument but has not rendered judgment in the
Steel Company's efforts to have the most recent court of appeal's judgment overturned.
It is of course possible that the Supreme Court would modify the views expressed in its
earlier judgment, particularly as the court's composition is quite different from what it
was in 1969.
121 There were in fact two dissenting opinions, one by Mr. Justice White, concurred
in by Mr. Justice Harlan, and another by Mr. Justice Fortas, concurred in by Mr. Justice
Stewart. They were in general agreement and, therefore, an amalgam is presented in
the text.
122 There can be no tied sale where there is only one product sold. In TimesPicayune Publishing Co., supra, note 102, the defendant published the sole morning and
one of two evening newspapers in New Orleans, and it refused to sell advertising space
in either one separately. The majority of the court concluded (at 613-14) that in essence
what was being sold to advertisers was readership and that since there was no evidence
in the record relating to "generic qualities differentiating morning from evening readers
in New Orleans", there was no basis upon which to conclude that advertising space in
the morning newspaper was a product different from advertising space in the evening
newspaper. See also, Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.
(1971), 438 F. 2d 248 (4th Cir.); M. E. Wheeler, Some Observations on Tie-ins, the
Single Product Defense, Exclusive Dealing and Regulated Industries (1972), 60 Calif.
L. Rev. 1557.
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is to distort the
article sold or more advantageous financing or credit terms.
an instrument which penalizes price comdoctrine, and, indeed, to convert it into
23
petition for the article that is sold.'

Any arrangement viewed as price competition can be challenged under the
antitrust laws only as predatory pricing in connection with monopolization.
The writer agrees with the dissent in FortnerEnterprises and is of the opinion

that what was involved was not really tied selling at all. The Steel Company
was not in the business of selling credit generally but used it only as a sales
device for its houses. 2- 4 Thus, Fortner Enterprises was not the sort of case

that would be presented, for example, if the Canadian chartered banks were
permitted entry into the equipment leasing business and then attempted to
beat out non-bank leasing competitors by offering cheaper than normal credit
to customers who would lease from the banks.12 5
Under U.S. law, defences available in a tied selling case are few. One of

those most frequently advanced - that the tying product would be in danger
of misfunctioning if used in conjunction with anything but the tied product,
thus endangering the goodwill in the tying product - has generally not been
received with favour because there is usually available an alternative less

restrictive of competition than tying, namely, specification of the type and
quality of the product to be used in conjunction with the tying device.126 "The
only situation, indeed, in which protection of goodwill may necessitate the use
of tying clauses is where specifications for a substitute would be so detailed

that they could not practicably be supplied.'

27

Another situation where speci-

123 Fortner Enterprises, supra, note 102 at 523. Compare, FTC v. Sinclair Refining
Co., supra, note 102, holding the oil companies' practices of leasing gasoline pumps at
nominal rates on condition that the pumps be used exclusively to dispense the respective
respondents' gasoline not violative of the Clayton Act, notwithstanding allegations of
injury to small oil companies that could not afford to subsidize cheap pumps and small
pump producers that had no gasoline sales from which to recoup losses on below cost
leasing of pumps. The decision was grounded on the court's view that the service station
proprietors were free to secure as many pumps and sell as many different types of
gasoline as they pleased. But as to the actual feasibility of split-pumping, see Kessler
and Stem, supra, note 77 at 38 n. 165.
-24 See, dissent of Mr. Justice Fortas in Fortner Enterprises,supra, note 102 at 521.
See also, Dam, supra, note 32 at 18, 23-31; D. I. Baker, Another Look at Franchise
Tie-ins After Texaco and Fortner (1969), 14 Antitrust Bull. 767 at 776.
125 See, Financial Post, August 28, 1976, at 4, col. 5. In Fortner Enterprises, Mr.
Justice Fortas was of the view (supra, note 102 at 522) that there was no tying involved
- period. Mr. Justice White (id. at 516) would have been prepared to entertain the action
as a tying case were there any possibility that plaintiff could show that the Steel Company had independent monopoly power in the market for credit, but he interpreted
plaintiff's pleadings and affidavits as falling far short of making out any allegation of
such power.
126 Standard Stations, supra, note 25 at 306; I.B.M. v. U.S., supra, note 102 at 139;
Harley-Davidson, supra, note 97 at 1067. But see, Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0.
Smith Corp. (1961), 292 F. 2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931, finding no
violation of the Clayton Act where defendant refused to sell its patented grain unloading device except for installation in its patented silo. The defendant had received numerous complaints concerning the unloader's operations where it was installed in silos
manufactured by others.
27
1
Standard Stations, id. at 306.
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fication would serve no purpose is where the only device suitable by its specifications for use in conjunction with the main device is itself patented. 28
In United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.,m the defendant was a
manufacturer of community antenna television systems. Technologically, such
a system consists of four distinct parts. The defendant sold only the system
as such and refused to sell any of the components separately; 8 0 furthermore,
it sold the system together with a mandatory installation and service contract.
The court absolved the defendant from liability for both aspects of the tied
sales during the defendant's early years in business on the basis that the ties
were reasonably necessary to protect the defendant's good will. The defendant
was the pioneer in manufacture of community antenna television systems; the
equipment involved was delicate; installation and servicing were complex
matters; and it was essential for the continued viability of defendant's business
that there not be a rash of systems failures at the start (as there had already
been on a small scale before the defendant had resorted to mandatory installation and servicing).131 With the legitimacy of the mandatory servicing contract
established, it was easy to justify the full system requirement on the basis that
the defendant could not render the service it promised and deemed necessary
if the customer could purchase any kind of equipment. 3 2 The court sustained
these defences, however, only for that period when Jerrold was "launching a
new business with a highly uncertain future" and not for the period after the
defendant had become fairly well established. 3 3 Thus, Jerrold Electronics
stands for a sort of new producer's technological relationship defence. 134
Another situation that has called for judicial recognition under U.S. law
of a defense to the otherwise per se strictures against tied selling is protection
of the goodwill value of a trademark 35 Some courts have held in the fran12 8
Furthermore, where the tied product is itself patented there may not be any competition to be substantially lessened with respect to it. Cf. Coniglio v. Highwood Services,
Inc. (1974), 495 F. 2d 1286 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022, holding no violation of the Sherman Act where the Buffalo, N.Y. professional football club refused to
sell regular season tickets except in a package with exhibition game tickets. The club
had a monopoly of exhibition professional football in the Buffalo area. The result in a
given case will depend upon tied product market definition, and the court in Coniglio
(id. at 1292) was satisfied that exhibition professional football was the relevant tied
product market.
120 (1960), 187 F. Supp. 545 (D.C. E.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, (1961), 365 U.S.
567. 180
The court discussed and dismissed (id. at 559-60) the contention that the system
was but a single product.

131 Id. at 549-62.
132 Id.
8

at 560.

1 3 Id. at 557-58.
184 A new producer's defense to tied selling was recognized by the Supreme Court
in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra, note 77 at 330 (dictum).
135 Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Company (1962), 308 F. 2d 403 at 41011 (5th Cir.); Susser v. Carvel Corp., supra, note 93 at 515; Siegel v. Chicken Delight,
Inc., supra, note 111 at 51; Perma-Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International PartsCorp. (1968),
392 U.S. 134 at 136 n. 4 (dictum). See generally, McCarthy, supra, note 56 at 1090-93,
1111-16.
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chised business context that the licence to use a trademark may itself be a
tying device under the Sherman Act. 136 Many of the cases have arisen in the
context of the "fast food" industry where tied products have included, for
example, ingredients for the food, the machinery used to prepare it and the
packaging in which it is sold.' 37 The trademark is only as good as the food
sold by the franchisees and absolute consistency across time and space is of
the essence. To the extent the food is prepared under a secret formula, as,
for example, in the cases of soft ice cream or fried chicken, specification is
obviously not a feasible alternative to tying. Even, however, where there is no
secret recipe, as perhaps in the case of hamburgers, it may not be practicable
to police quality control by any method short of tied selling, that is, indicating
the sources from which the ingredients or the food are to be purchased by the
franchisee. As we move further away from the food itself, however, to the
packaging, for example, the justification for tying becomes slimmer because
simultaneously the policing problem becomes less acute while the feasibility
of specification as an alternative increases.
The Combines Investigation Act provides a defence for "tied selling that
is reasonable having regard to the technological relationship between or
among the products to which it applies."' 138 "Reasonable" is, to be sure, a
word most receptive of a broad or a restrictive interpretation. If, however,
the RTPC takes the rather jaundiced view of tying arrangements that prevails
in the United States, it will probably similarly limit the technological relationship defence to those situations where specification is not practicable.
There is no "new business" defence in the Combines Investigation Act for
tied selling, as opposed to exclusive dealing. However, the phraseology of
the "technological relationship" defence is probably broad enough to cover
facts similar to those in Jerrold Electronics.139 Also, careful examination
of the definitions in The Act will reveal that tied selling, as therein defined,
is a sub-classification of the more generally defined phenomenon of exclusive dealing. 40 Therefore a new product defence could conceivably be made
available by treating cases of tied selling as exclusive dealing, although at
the cost of violating the familiar canon of statutory construction that the
136 Susser v. Carvel Corp., id. at 519; Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., id. at 47;
Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp. (1972), 463 F. 2d 1002 at
1015-16 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086; Carpa,Inc. v. Ward Foods. Inc. (1976),
536 F. 2d 39 at 48. Contra: Kugler v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions Inc. (1972),
460 F. 2d 1214 (8th Cir.); Redd v. Shell Oil Co. (1975), 524 F. 2d 1054 (10th Cir.);
Carvel Corp. (1965), 68 FTC 128 at 174-76. See generally, McCarthy, supra, note 56
at 1108-09; Comment, FranchiseTie-ins and Antitrust: A CriticalAnalysis, [1973] Wisc.
L. Rev. 847 at 860-62. While a trademark may be a tying device under s. 1 of the
Sherman Act, it probably cannot be a tying commodity under s. 3 of the Clayton Act.
See, Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts, supra, note 115 at 1215 n. 4. Furthermore, a trademark
does not necessarily have such dominance as to satisfy the requirements for per se
illegality under the Sherman Act, supra, note 111.
13
7 Susser v. Carvel Corp., id.; Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., id.; Ungar v. Dunkin'
Donuts, id.
138 C.LA., s. 31.4(4) (b).
139 Supra, note 129.
140 Compare clause (a) (i) of the respective definitions in s. 31.4(1) of The Act.
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specific governs over the general. Protection of trade names is not an enumerated defence to tied selling under the Combines Investigation Act. In
a statute which lists all exemptions, rather than leaving them to be developed
on a case-by-case basis, the omission seems fairly serious. Conceivably the
technological relationship defence could be stretched to fill
the void, but it
1 41
would indeed require a stretch.
4.

The TBA Trilogy
A series of three cases initiated in 1956 by the FTC under section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act established the illegality of market access
arrangements between the major oil companies and the major producers of
t.b.a.142 A market access arrangement in the service station industry is an
agreement between an oil company and a t.b.a. producer whereby the oil
company agrees to recommend (to use a neutral term) to its service station
dealers the products of the t.b.a. company, which pays to the oil company a
commission on all t.b.a. sales made to the oil company's dealers. 143
In the first of the cases to reach the Supreme Court, Atlantic Refining
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, the court affirmed the Commission's orders
prohibiting Atlantic from being a party to any market access arrangement
with any t.b.a. producer and similarly prohibiting Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company (the party with which Atlantic had the arrangement in litigation
and a party to the proceeding) from being a party to any such arrangement
with an oil company. 144 Atlantic was found to have very significant leverage
over its dealers in the form of short term leases, equipment loan contracts and
contracts for the supply of gasoline. The Commission found (and Atlantic
did not appeal this finding) that Atlantic, with the active aid and encouragement of Goodyear, had coerced its dealers, by direct threats of termination of
their status as such, into purchasing t.b.a. from Goodyear. The Supreme
Court, emphasizing this practice of direct and overt threats, 45 affirmed both
the Commission's finding of "an unfair method of competition" under section
5 and the broad relief ordered. Curiously, the court stated that "the Goodyear-Atlantic contract is not a tying arrangement" because "Atlantic is not
14' Furthermore, expansion of the technological relationship defense in this way
would, in the case of fast food and beverage operations, be open to a sort of expressio
unius objection since there is in s. 31.4(7) of The Act an exemption for market restriction arrangements in those industries.
The franchise-affiliation exemption, s. 31.4(5)(c), for exclusive dealing and tied
selling would probably not be available in most cases, since it is required for that exemption that "no one product" dominate the business. See text accompanying notes 54-59,
supra.
142
Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC (1965), 381 U.S. 357; Shell Oil Company v. FTC

(1966), 360 F. 2d 470 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002; FTC v. Texaco, Inc.
(1968), 393 U.S. 223. The t.b.a. producers in the cases, respectively the Goodyear,
Firestone and Goodrich rubber companies, the three largest in the United States, produced their own tires and certain automobile accessories. In addition, they sold under
their respective names batteries produced for them by other companies.
43
.
Supra, text accompanying note 8.
144 Before instituting the market access method of t.b.a. distribution, Atlantic had
purchased t.b.a. itself and resold it to its dealers, (supra,note 142 at 364 n. 6), but the
purchase-resale method was not before the Commission or the court.
145 Id. at 368.
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required to tie its sale of gasoline... to purchase of Goodyear" products and
because Atlantic does not "expressly require such purchases of its dealers. 1 4
But having said that what was involved was not a tying arrangement, the
court then proceeded to analyze the case as precisely that, citing tied sale
cases and stating that "the central competitive characteristic" was the same
as in tying: "the utilization of economic power in one market to curtail competition in another." 47 Furthermore, said the court, citing Northern Pacific
Railway Co. v. United States, the Commission was justified in not considering
evidence of the oil companies' legitimate business purposes in adopting market
access arrangements "considering the destructive effect on commerce that
would result from the widespread use of these contracts by major oil companies.' 48
The next t.b.a. case to come before an appellate court on the merits was
virtually a replay of the Atlantic-Goodyear arrangements, but without proof
of overt coercion by the oil company against its dealers. In Shell Oil Company
v. FederalTrade Commission, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
read Atlantic Refining as approaching "only to the brink of holding t.b.a. sales
commission contracts per se unlawful" and stated that the rationale of the
earlier decision depended upon "three essential components": first, the oil
company's dominant economic power over its dealers; second, exercise of that
power; and, third, anti-competitive effects of the use of the power. 149 The
court in Shell had little problem in finding the first element. The oil company's
dominant power over its dealers rested in its "firm velvet-gloved grip on control devices", such as short term leases and equipment loan contracts, both
terminable on little if any notice, control of dealers' advertising and control
ultimately of their gasoline supply.150 Secondly, the court found that Shell did
indeed use its economic power over its dealers to cause them to buy sponsored
t.b.a. (produced in this case by the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company) although without resort to the overt coercion employed by Atlantic. Shell never
missed an opportunity to extol to its dealers the merits of stocking sponsored
t.b.a., and frequently Shell's own salesmen would visit dealers in conjunction
with Firestone salesmen. Since the reports of the oil company's salesmen are key
in determining renewal of dealerships, the message behind the double teaming
was presumably not lost on the dealers, a number of whom in fact were under
the impression that they were required to purchase sponsored t.b.a. and that
their franchises would be in jeopardy if they did not do so. 15 And, boosting
proof with prose, the court concluded:
46
1 Id. at 369. The first factor cited by the court does not appear to the writer to be
significant in determining whether there was a tying arrangement in the form of directed
buying. What counts for the existence of tying is not what Atlantic was required to do
under its agreement with Goodyear but only what Atlantic required of its dealers. The
finding of overt coercion was a finding that in fact Atlantic required its dealers, as a
condition of remaining Atlantic dealers, to purchase t.b.a. from Goodyear - in sum,

a tied sale.
147 Id. at 369-71.
148 Id. at 371.
149 Shell v. FTC, supra, note 142 at 477.
L50Id. at 481.
151 Id. at 482-83.
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A man operating a gas station is bound to be overawed by the great corporation

that is his supplier, his banker, and his landlord. When he hears that Shell will
benefit from his patronage of sponsored t.b.a. outlets, the velvet glove of request
has within it the mailed fist of command.1 52

On the third factor, anti-competitive effect, the court found that Shell dealers

clearly were choosing Firestone t.b.a. because of Shell's sponsorship rather
than on a disinterested evaluation of its merits. 153 Anti-competitive effects
were found in that other marketers of t.b.a. were not able to compete with
Firestone for the patronage of Shell's dealers and the dealers, in turn, were
placed at a competitive disadvantage with respect to dealers free to stock
several brands of t.b.a. 15 4 On the other hand, the court referred to the statistical picture as "muddy". 55 Quite so. In none of the three t.b.a. cases was any
serious attempt made to estimate the proportion of a relevant geographic
market for t.b.a. foreclosed by the market access arrangements, and in each
case the courts were satisfied with reference to the enormous dollar amounts,
in the tens of millions, of t.b.a. sold under the arrangements in question. 56
The final case in the trilogy, Federal Trade Commission v. Texaco,
Inc.,5 7 is indistinguishable on its facts and its rationale from Shell. Indeed its

significance lies in the complete adoption by the Supreme Court of the Fifth
Circuit's views in Shell. Under Texaco, a market access arrangement is illegal
where (1) the oil company has dominant economic power over its dealers
and (2) uses it with (3) an anticompetitive result. The requisite power will
be found in the case of any large oil company; it's use will always be established, granted the Texaco court's declaration that "the sales-commission
system for marketing t.b.a. is inherently coercive";' 5 8 and anti-competitive
effect is presumed from the formulation of the problem as a tying one: extension of power from the market for one product to the market for another.
The proposition becomes one, if not of per se, at least of res ipsa loquitur: the
rubber companies are not paying the oil companies a ten percent commission
for nothing.'5 9
152

Id. at 487.

15a Id. at 484-86.
4

'N Id. at 484.
1
55 Id. at 479 n.
5

21.
1 0 In FTC v. Texaco (supra, note 142 at 230 n. 2), however, there was evidence
from 31 sellers of competing, non-sponsored t.b.a. that they were unable to sell to particular Texaco stations because of the dealers' concern that Texaco would disapprove of
their purchase of non-sponsored products.
15

7 Id.

15 8 Id. at 229.
169 Id. It is not entirely clear, however, just why the oil companies entered into these
arrangements, whether to earn "windfall profits" in the form of the commissions, or as a
defensive measure to ensure their respective market positions in the sale of gasoline and
other petroleum products, or simply because they considered it good business practice
to keep a tight rein generally on what suppliers their dealers patronized, lest the dealers
become accustomed to wandering. The commissions were not all profit since the oil
companies apparently incurred considerable expenditures in promoting sponsored tb.a.
See Shell v. FTC, supra,note 142 at 472 n. 3.
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While in both Atlantic Refining and Texaco, the Supreme Court made
ample reference to the deference owed to the Commission in interpreting
section 5 of the FederalTrade Commission Act, and although the Commission
may find a practice "unfair" under section 5 even though such practice does
not amount either to a Sherman Act or a Clayton Act violation, 160 the market
access t.b.a. cases cannot be dismissed as "mere" section 5 cases. Despite the
refusal of the court to call them tied selling cases, the analysis employed was
mainstream tied sale analysis. 161
Under section 31.4 of the Combines Investigation Act, a market access
arrangement in the automotive service station industry will fall within the

definition of tied selling in those cases where the oil company can be said to
"require" its dealers to purchase the sponsored t.b.a. as a condition to the
purchase of another product or where the company can be said to "induce"
its dealers so to act by offering the tying product on more favourable terms

than otherwise. The tying product might be construed to be the gasoline or
perhaps, more generally, a dealer's status as such. "Dealer's status", in turn,
is the sum of the value to the dealer of the company's trade name plus the
other benefits flowing to a dealer under its relationship with a particular
company: leased premises, financing, dispensing equipment or whatever. To
see whether a reviewable practice was present, each case would have to be
judged very much on its own facts for identification both of the tying product
and of the element of requirement or inducement.
TBE AUSTRALIAN SHELL PROCEEDING

E.

The Trade Practices Commission in Australia has recently considered
at length the status under the Trade PracticesAct, 1974-1975,12 of exclusive
63
dealing arrangements for the retail distribution of petroleum products.

16oFederal Trade Commission v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., supra,
note 82; Federal Trade Commission v. Brown Shoe Co. (1966), 384 U.S. 316; Federal
Trade Commission v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. (1972), 405 U.S. 233.
161 Indeed, even before the t.b.a. trilogy of cases, two courts of appeals in private,
treble damage actions had held market access arrangements for t.b.a. distribution to constitute tied selling: Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co. (1960), 286 F. 2d 832 at 840 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied (1961), 366 U.S. 963 (arrangement unlawful per se under s. 1 of

the Sherman Act); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co. (1964), 327 F. 2d 459 at 467-70 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993.
On the other hand, in two private actions after the tb.a. trilogy, both arising out
of the very arrangements considered in those cases, the courts refused to find the market
access arrangements unlawful per se under the Sherman or Clayton Acts: Lee National
Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1970), 308 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Pa.); Belliston v.
Texaco, Inc. (1972), 455 F. 2d 175 at 183-84 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928.

The courts in these latter cases emphasized that the trilogy arose under s. 5 of the

FederalTrade Commission Act, that in the trilogy the deference owed to agency findings
came into play and that the Supreme Court had expressly declined to call the plans tied

selling. On the substantive law differences that may arise depending upon whether the
action is government-instituted or private, see note 118, supra.
Trade Practices Act, 1974-75 (Cth.).
in the Applications of the Shell Company of Australia Limited and Neptune Oil
Company Pty. Limited for Authorization Pursuant to Sub-Section 88(1) and Sub-Section
88(6) of the Trade Practices Act 1974-1975, decision dated December 9, 1975.
162
3

I
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Although the ultimate question before the Australian Commission was not
the same as will face the Canadian RTPC under Section 31.4 of the Combines
Investigation Act, the proceeding is of considerable interest as the work of a
specialized tribunal, not dissimilar in concept to our own, in applying the
provisions of a new statute relating to exclusive dealing. In a proceeding in
which it was required to deal with a mass of more or less technical economic
data, the Trade Practices Commission in The Application of Shell Company
of AustraliaLimited managed to deliver an opinion that is both intelligent and
intelligible to the layman.
Section 47 of the Trade PracticesAct defines exclusive dealing generally
as the supply of goods or services, or the setting of a price for the supply of
goods or services, upon condition that the consumer will not acquire the goods
or services of a competitor of the supplier. Exclusive dealing contravenes the
Act when it "is likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition
in a market for goods or services."1u 4 Under such circumstances, a supplier
engaging in exclusive dealing may be subject to a variety of civil actions for
pecuniary penalties, 1 5 injunctive relief' 66 or damages to a private party suffering injury. 167 In order to shield itself from these various liabilities, a
party proposing to engage in "conduct that would or may . . .constitute

exclusive dealing" may, under section 88(6), apply to the Commission for
an "authorization" to engage in such conduct, and if the authorization is
granted, such conduct cannot be held to violate section 47. When an application for an authorization is made, the Commission is to publish notice of it,
consider the submissions of interested parties and, where appropriate, hold a
public hearing.'0 8 The Commission is not to grant the authorization unless it
is satisfied that the conduct to which the application relates
results, or is likely to result in a substantial benefit to the public... that would
not otherwise be available, and that, in all the circumstances, that result, or that
likely result ... justifies the granting of the authorization. 169

Shell Oil Company of Australia and its subsidiary, Neptune Oil Company, made applications under section 88(6) for authorizations of their exclusive dealing arangements in petroleum products with their various classes
of service station dealers.' 7 0 The Commission chose to treat the applications
as a "test case"; it held extensive public hearing and received both written
submissions and evidence from all of the major oil companies as well as from
the smaller companies and from distributor and dealer groups.' 7 1
Trade Practices Act, s. 47(5).
165 Id. s.76.
166 Id.s.80.
10 7 Id. s. 82. Criminal proceedings, on the other hand, do not lie with respect to
exclusive dealing, id., s. 78.
108 1d. ss. 89(2), 90(2), 90(3).
16 Id. s. 90(5).
104

17o At issue were petroleum products only, that is, gasoline and lubricating oils, and
Shell did not have tied sale arrangements for t.b.a. (supra, note 163 at 4). Thus the
proceedings presented issues more analogous to the American Standard Stations case
than to the t.b.a. trilogy of cases or to the Canadian TBA Report.
71
1

Supra, note 163 at 1, 9, Appendices F, G, and H.
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At the outset,17 2 the Commission emphasized that under the terms of
Section 90(5) of the Act three separate elements had to be present for the
grant of an authorization: (1) the practice would be likely to result in a substantial benefit to the public, (2) that was not otherwise available, and (3)
in all of the circumstances such benefit would justify granting the authorization. In particular, the Commission held that it was not called upon to decide
whether, in the absence of an authorization, the conduct in question would
violate section 47, that is, whether it would be likely to have the effect of
substantially lessening competition. This interpretation followed from the
wording of section 88(6) of the Act which provides that upon application
an authorization may be granted where the conduct "would or may" constitute
exclusive dealing. A party makes an application where it believes that its
conduct, if not authorized, might be in breach of the Act. The Commission's
duty is then to decide the application on the public benefit grounds spelled
out in the Act. It is not one of those grounds that the application might
appear to be unnecessary. 173 The effect of the practice upon competition was
seen by the Commission, however, as a highly relevant part of the "circumstances" to be considered in deciding whether to grant an authorization, and,
indeed, much of the Commission's lengthy opinion was devoted to an assessment of the state of competition within the industry.
In 1973, Shell was the largest oil company in Australia, with approximately 22 percent of a highly oligopolized market wherein the top three firms
had 53 percent of the market, the top four 66 percent and the top five 76
percent. 174 There were no independent refiners in Australia, that is, each of
the eight refineries was owned by a major oil company actively engaged in the
retail end of the business. 175 Thus, the small marketers were, and any new
entrant into petroleum marketing would be, totally dependent upon one or
more of the "majors" for a source of supply. Therefore, a new entrant's desire
to compete with the majors by price cutting could
be expected to be con176
siderably dampened by considerations of prudence.
The Commission found gasoline of a given grade to be fungible among
the different oil companies, and the demand was found to be relatively price
inelastic.177
172 Id. at 13-15.
173 Even assuming that the company's exclusive dealing arrangements had in fact
violated s. 47, a matter that the Commission scrupulously avoided ruling upon, it was
not subject to the risk of private damage actions because the Commission had granted
for the pendency of the proceeding an interim authorization under the terms of s. 91(2)
of the Trade Practices Act, and therefore the practice could not violate s. 47 during the
effectiveness of the interim authorization.
174 Supra, note 163 at 17. See also, D. F. Dixon, Some Competitive Effects of
Vertical Relationships in Australian Petrol Distribution (1976), 17 Antitrust Bull. 791.
Prof. Dixon observes (id. at 795, 806) that, while between the early 1950's and late
1960's the very largest Australian oil companies experienced a declining market share
and there was vigorous new entry, that history is not likely to be repeated since all the

refineries are now owned by the major companies and exclusive dealing has tied up most

of the desirable retail sites.
5
17 Id. at 22.
176 Id. at 30.
177 Id. at 25, 26.
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Shell retail gasoline outlets were by number 40 per cent company-owned
and lessee-operated, 58 percent dealer-owned and 2 percent company-owned
and operated. In terms of volume of Shell gasoline sold, however, the figures
were 73 percent, 22 percent and 5 percent, respectively. The notable point
is that the dealer-owned stations were generally small volume operations. 17 8
Both lessee-dealers and proprietor-dealers were contractually bound to refrain
from dealing in the petroleum products of any producer other than Shell.179
In the case of the lessee-dealers, the terms of the lease reserved to the company many other forms of control over the conduct of the lessee's business,
and typically at termination of the lease the lessee was bound to refrain from
dealing in the products of another oil company within a two mile radius for a
period of two years.' 80
Notwithstanding the general regime of exclusive dealing demanded by
the major oil companies of their retailers, one company that marketed lubricants only, Castrol Limited, had access to the service stations tied to three of
the major companies, including Shell. Two of these companies were the ones
from which Castrol purchased nearly all of its oil, and even so, Castrol's
product was not permitted display space at a given station equal to that provided for lubricants of the major oil company to which the service station was
18
tied. 1
Shell, which was the first of the oil companies in Australia to introduce
exclusive dealing, 8 2 staked its argument of substantial benefit to the public
upon the very substantial economies in transport costs achieved by delivering
gasoline in large 'drops' occurring at regular intervals so that the trucks'
routes could be computer programmed. In addition, these deliveries were in
many cases made at night, when there was no attendant present at the service
station, and payment was made by means of a locked box to which the delivery man had the key. Although payment by the dealers was theoretically
made upon delivery to them of the gasoline, in order to encourage dealers to
accept gasoline in very large drops, the company effectively extended them
credit, for example, by accepting post-dated cheques from dealers so that they
did not pay for the gasoline until at least part of it was sold.'1 The very considerable cost economies achieved by this system would be lost, Shell argued,
if dealers were not bound to take all of their gasoline from one company.
The result would be a perceptible rise in the price of gasoline to the consumer.
Thus, exclusive8 4dealing conferred a significant benefit to the public not otherwise available.'
In the proceeding, it was conceded by all parties that the transport system
presently in effect was a great deal more efficient than that which had pre178

Id. at 34, 37.
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Id. at Appendix E.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 18-20.
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Id. at 48-52.
184 Id. at 81.
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vailed in the early 1950's and that this more efficient system constituted a
significant benefit to the public. 8 5 The contentious point was whether the
benefit would be lost in the absence of exclusive dealing. With the issues so
framed, the respective parties assumed what, from the perspective of Canadian
and American exclusive dealing legislation, would be a decidedly odd posture:
company counsel attempted to show that in the absence of an authorization
multibrand trading would become common, while Crown counsel'"s argued
that if the authorization were denied the practices of service station dealers
would change little. The Commission agreed with the latter view, and therefore it declined to grant the authorization.

It was not seen as likely that any new oil companies would be appearing
on the Australian scene as marketers of gasoline, since all of the eight Australian refineries were owned by the "majors" and new refineries were not in
the cards. 187 Thus, in the absence of an authorization (assuming that the companies would not continue to demand exclusive dealing of their dealers without an authorization), competition for the gasoline business would continue
to be among the majors for the most part. The great majority of service
stations, in terms of gallons sold, were under lease to the majors. No major
company, nor any other marketer dependent upon a major company for
supply, would attempt to sell gasoline to a site leased to another major for
fear of retaliation.18 8 Similar considerations would prevent an active campaign
to attract a desirable site away from another major at expiry of a lease. The
only sites, then, available as arenas for competition were the dealer owned
ones, and they generally were small gallonage operations that would not be
very attractive customers to an oil company. 8 9 The evidence indicated to the
Commission that, in the absence of an authorization, there would be a few
dealers who would wish to engage in multi-brand trading; they would be
supplied by more than one company only if more than one company found it
efficient to do so. 190 As to dealers' switching to solo trading with other com185 In the earlier period, multi-brand trading was the rule, but the Commission
pointed out (id. at 92) that it was not until many years after exclusive dealing became
the uniform practice that real transport economies were achieved.
186 The application for an authorization is initiated by the entity subject to the Trade
PracticesAct, and it is not clear just who, if anybody, is to represent the public interest
or assume the role of devil's advocate, although s. 27 of The Act provides that the Commission is to have a staff. In Appendix H to the Shell decision, there is an appearance
listed for "Assistant Crown Solicitor's Officer assisting the Commission."
187 Supra, note 163 at 30-32, 73-74, 87. The Commission contrasted this with the
situation prevailing in the United States where there are over 150 refiners independent
of the major oil companies and a sizeable number of regional, private brand marketers.
See also, Adelman, supra, note 43 at 61-62, Dixon, supra, note 174 at 806.
188 Supra, note 163 at 61-62, 85. If in fact, in the absence of exclusive dealing, the
oil companies would respect the sanctity of each other's sites to the extent indicated by
witnesses before the Commission, that might suggest some sort of gentlemen's agreement
among the companies that would amount to a classic horizontal conspiracy in restraint
of trade. The point was not explored by the Commission.
'89 Id. at 75. The trend in Australia was quite markedly toward fewer and larger
gallonage service stations and, to this end, Shell was engaged in a 15-year plan to reduce
the number of its lessee outlets, id. at 63.
19o Id. at 90.
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panies, that would not be at all inconsistent with continued transport economies; there had probably been entirely too little of it in the past; and the
possibility of switching where another company is prepared to offer better
terms might
at least apply some much needed competitive pressure at the
0
margins.' '

With regard to lubricants, the picture was quite different. On the one
hand, the asserted economies of large volume delivery were not of a scale
remotely equal to the case of gasoline, and, on the other, there were a number
of companies engaged in the manufacture of lubricants only that under the
exclusive dealing regime had virtually no access to service stations.192 The end
of exclusive dealing in lubricants was likely to produce more real change and welcome change - in service stations' practices than in the case of
gasoline. 193
The Commission declined to authorize the contracts that bound dealers
to refrain from dealing in the petroleum products of competitors of Shell, and
it also denied authorization for the lessees' convenants not to compete after
termination of their leases. 9 4 Nonetheless, it authorized Shell to require that
equipment bearing its trade name be used exclusively to distribute its products,
as protection
for the trade name and to avoid deceiving the purchasing
95
public1
The Commission emphasized that its decision left the companies free
to bargain with dealers on delivery sizes, thereby preserving transport economies. Furthermore, the companies might continue to require acceptance by
dealers of night deliveries and the locked box system of payment, thereby
keeping the companies' expensive equipment in continuous operation. 9 6
Presumably the companies could refuse altogether to suply those dealers who
would not or could not accept deliveries of minimum efficient volume. All that
was not authorized was the contractual requirement of exclusive dealing.
What was achieved was, at most, a slight shift in the balance of power between
producers and dealers. Indeed, little else was foreseen by the Commission, and
it was precisely on assumptions of little practical change that it based its decision. Probably Shell saw things that way too, for it decided197
not to exercise
its statutory right of appeal to the Trade Practices Tribunal.
F.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The approach of the Combines Investigation Act in committing a sub-

stantial segment of antitrust law to the jurisdiction of a specialized administra191 Id. at 91.
192

193

Id. at 19, 98.
Id. at 99.

1 Id. at 105.
1951 d. at 96, 105.
190 Id. at 92, 106-107.
197

Trade PracticesAct, s. 101.
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tive agency has much to commend it, at least in theory. Hopefully, the
specialized agency can develop a coherent, consistent policy which could not
be done in a muliplicity of courts or perhaps even in one court that was occupied with very many different types of litigation. And in the informed disposition of individual cases, as well, the agency may be more efficacious than
the court. As K. C. Davis has put it:
A court is passive. It has no obligation to search for evidence which parties fail
to present. A regulatory agency has an affirmative duty to carry out a program,
to protect a public interest which frequently is otherwise unrepresented. When
parties fail to produce needed facts, the regulatory agency typically must take
the initiative in aggressively making its own factual investigation. Unlike a court,
a regulatory agency employs staffs of specialists, wields independent powers of
investigation, and accumulates vast storehouses of information about its specialized
field.198

The specialized agency approach has particular appeal in an area where much
of the evidence that will be needed to make adjudications is of an economic
nature; courts are exceedingly hesitant, even in combines cases, to confront
any question that vaguely smacks of that branch of learning called economics.
In particular, a specialized agency may be better equipped than a generalist
court to handle the tasks of product and geographic market definition, tasks
that, unfortunately, can be exceedingly complex but that are obviously essential to a determination whether "competition is or is likely to be lessened substantially" and to the fashioning of relief "necessary to restore or stimulate
competition in the market."'199
If, however, we are to applaud the jurisdiction of the expert agency, it is
only fair to inquire just how expert it is. The Restrictive Trade Practices Commission has been in existence since 1952,200 but until the most recent amendments it has had no substantive jurisdiction; its activities have been limited to
oversight of the investigations conducted by the Director of Investigations and
Research and to the issuance of reports on various industries. With all respect,
the Commission just has not had much to do, and so there is little basis upon
which to judge its expertise. 201
The thrust of academic writing on the performance of the RTPC's neighbour to the south, the Federal Trade Commission, would lead one to believe
that as an economically expert tribunal the FTC has been something of a

198K. C. Davis, Official Notice (1949), 62 Harv. L. Rev. 537.
199 C.I.A., s. 31.4(2). Judges are not, however, constitutionally incapable of rising
to the challenge. See the opinions of Mr. Justice Gibson in R. v. Canadian Coat and
Apron Supply Ltd., [19671 2 Ex. C.R. 53, 52 C.P.R. 189; and in R. v. J. W. Mills & Sons
Ltd., [19681 2 Ex. C.R. 275, 56 C.P.R. 1, aff'd, 14 D.L.R. (3d) 464 (S.C.C.). But see
generally, D. Cayne, Market Power, Efficiencies and the Public Interest in Canadian
Combines Law (1970), 16 McGill L.J. 488. And, on the complexities of market definition, see: Bok, supra, note 20 at 301; Turner, supra, note 24 at 59.
200 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1952 (supp.), c. 314.
201 In the reports issued to date, furthermore, of which there are over fifty, it is
generally not easy to differentiate between the input of the Director of Investigation and
Research and his staff and that of the Commission itself.
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booming failure.20 2 The reasons assigned for this failure have been various,
and not all would be applicable to the RTPC. The FTC's effective functioning
is seen as having been seriously compromised by the jurisdictional split between itself and the courts; 20 3 the FTC has had remarkably few professional
economists in the ranks of its members or its staff; appointments to the Commission have often been of poor quality, being distributed frequently as consolation prizes for defeat in political elections; and continuity has been lacking,
as most commissioners, however un-expert in economics upon appointment,
have served terms far shorter than the seven years contemplated by the statute
before retiring to greener economic pastures. On the other hand, the FTC has
been more amply provided with budget and staff than can realistically be
expected for the RTPC, even on a proportional basis. One criticism, in particular, of the FTC that has an ominous ring with respect to the RTPC concerns the great number of years consumed in deciding cases. 204 If one looks
at recent industry reports of the RTPC, one often notes a very large gap
between the time periods2 05to which the data relate and the date of publication
of the particular report.
Early in the course of exercising its jurisdiction over the various "reviewable practices", the RTPC may have to decide whether it has a mandate to
preserve a regime of small producers of goods, even at the cost of efficiency.
Of particular concern in section 31.4, particularly with respect to exclusive
dealing, is definitional language that could be interpreted as prohibiting cost
justified reductions in price for volume purchasing. 20 6 Presumably the distinction that is to be drawn is between discounts granted for volume purchases
and discounts granted for refraining from dealing with the discounter's competitors. If the volume discounts are for an amount of purchases such as
effectively to produce the result of exclusive dealing, then, it is submitted,
just so long as they are cost justified, the Commission ought not interfere.
The Commission also will have to decide whether the competition that is not
to be substantially lessened by exclusive dealing and tied selling has reference
solely to the opportunities open to the suppliers' or whether it includes damage to the state of competition among dealers impeded from carrying the
various brands of goods that their business judgments would otherwise dictate.
Hopefully, the Commission will opt for the more inclusive interpretation.
202 See, e.g., I. W. Markham, The Federal Trade Commission's Use of Economics
(1964), 64 Colum. L. Rev. 405 (Professor Markham was Chief Economist of the FTC
from 1953 to 1955); M. Adelman, Recent Reports on Antitrust Policy: An Economist's
View (1970), 25 Assn. Bar of C. N.Y. Rec. 565 at 574; P. Asch, Antitrust and the
Policymaking Problem: The Law-Economics Dichotomy (1972), 5 Antitrust L. & Ec.
Rev. 45, D. F. Turner, Antitrust Policy (1970), 25 Assn. of Bar of C. N.Y. Rec. 305;
V. H. Kramer, President Ford's Antitrust Program: A Critical Elaboration (1975), 56
Chic. Bar Rec. 357 at 362-64.
2
03 Supra, text accompanying notes 75 and 98.
204 Kramer, supra, note 202 at 363.

205 E.g., DraughtBeer, Metropolitan Toronto (RTPC No. 54, 1972); Electric Large

Lamps (RTPC No. 53, 1971). In the TBA Report, supra, note 10, all of the data was
from four to eight years old at the time of publication (1962).
20
Supra, text accompanying notes 43 and 44.
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The legislative decision to set out the exemptions in the Act, rather than
to leave them to be developed under some sort of common law of the RTPC,
will be taken by the Commission to deprive it of jurisdiction to recognize
further exemptions. Yet some further exemptions may prove desirable, and
the writer is not at all certain that meritorious cases will always be able to be
dealt with on the basis that competition has not been substantially lessened.
For example, there is no protection of trademark exemption for either exclusive dealing or tied selling. Without it, can a large national company
license the use of its trade name and assure itself that only its products will
be sold under its name? If a filling station trades under the prominently displayed name "Gulf", motorists probably expect to be sold only gasoline produced by Gulf Oil Company, even if many know that gasoline of a given
grade is fungible. 207 Can Howard Johnson's demand of its franchisees that
they not sell Baskin-Robbins ice cream?208 The section of the Act relating
to tied selling has been drafted totally without reference to the law of trademarks; yet it would appear that a trademark owner who has licensed use of
the mark may be obligated to exercise very substantial controls over the
licensees in order that the mark not lose its distinctiveness. 20 9 While there is
a new producer exemption available in the case of exclusive dealing, there
is not such an exemption for tied selling. Yet conceivably on such facts as
were present in the Jerrold Electronics case,210 such an exemption would be
warranted.
An additional cause for concern is the rather awkwardly drawn "affiliation" defense for both exclusive dealing and tied selling in favour of certain
franchise businesses selling "products obtained from competing sources of
supply and a multiplicity of suppliers [where] no one product dominates such
business." 211 One questions simultaneously whether the exemption will avail
those businesses for whose benefit it was apparently intended212 and whether,
on the contrary, it will eventually cut a huge hole right through section 31.4.
These examples are cited not so much as a criticism of the exemptions
included in the statute but rather by way of questioning the wisdom of writing
in the exemptions at all, as opposed to letting them develop through adjudication, as has occurred to some extent in the United States. 218 It would have
2
02 This example has been chosen because presumably the franchise-affiliation defence of s. 31.4(5) (c)would not apply since one product - gasoline - dominates the
business. In the service station example, what may occur is that many stations will no
longer advertise the supplying company's name in banner headlines; rather, the company's
name will appear only on the pumps themselves. If so, that would constitute a substantial
loss of value to the trade name.
208 Here the availability of the franchise-affiliation defence is doubtful since the
franchisee does not obtain the multiplicity of products it sells from competing sources
of supply. See supra, notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
209 D. R. Bereskin, Trade Mark Licensing and Registered Users in Canada (1973),

11 C.P.R. (2d) 244.
210 Supra, note 129.
211 C.I.A.,

s. 31.4(5) (c).

note 59 and accompanying text.
218 Supra, notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
212 Supra,
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been a very tricky business indeed to have drafted exemptions to cover all the
problems. While, for example, one may find it quite reasonable that only Gulf
gasoline can be sold at stations trading under the name "Gulf", one might feel
differently in the case of tires. Is the line to be drawn between exclusive dealing in what the supplier itself manufactures and what the supplier purchases
from others for sale under the supplier's trade name? We then draw the lines
of competition policy along corporate forms. What if Gulf should purchase
or incorporate a tire producing subsdiiary? 214
Exclusive dealing comprehends basically three types of arrangements,
corresponding to the different motivations of the parties, and not all of the
types would be subject to the Combines Investigation Act. The first type of

arrangement, which this paper has taken as typical and to which the Act most
clearly is directed, involves the supplier who will sell to dealers or other
customers only on the basis that they refrain from purchasing the goods of the
supplier's competitors. Occasionally, however, the impetus for exclusive dealing may come from the customer, who wishes to assure himself of a source of
supply.2 15 A supplier in such a case will usually not commit itself to fill the
requirements of a customer over a given period without the customer assuming
a reciprocal obligation to deal exclusively with that supplier. The agreement
in substance, then, will import the notion of the supplier "requiring" the
customer to "deal only or primarily in products supplied by... the supplier",
and thus will be subject to section 31.4 of the Act. Moreover, there is no
apparent reason why such a practice ought not be prohibited where it is likely
to have the effect of substantially lessening competition in the sale of the
subject product. Under the third type of arrangement, the balance of power
between supplier and customer is switched completely: the customer makes
it a condition of dealing with a particular supplier that the customer be the
exclusive outlet for the supplier's goods and that the supplier not sell to the
customer's competitors.2'0 Such a practice clearly would not fall within the
terms of section 31.4, which speaks of requirements imposed by suppliers.
The problem, however, is far from fanciful and could have serious anti-competitive effects in the customer's industry. Exclusive dealing is not always a
matter of David dealers and Goliath suppliers. Surely such retaining giants as
Eaton's and Simpson's, for example, must
be more powerful firms than a good
21 7
many, if not most, of their suppliers.
214 Compare the recent acquisition in the United States of Marcor Inc. by the
Mobil Oil Corporation. Marcor is the corporate parent of, inter alia, Montgomery Ward
& Co., the retail giant. At the time of the acquisition, Montgomery Ward operated some

600 auto service centres. See, Wall Street Journal,August 13, 1974, at 9, col. 2; Septem-

ber 25, 1974, at 8, col. 3.
215 E.g., Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., supra, note 21.

210 E.g., Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FTC (1969), 414 F. 2d 974 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, (1970), 397 U.S. 907. This arrangement can exist not only between
suppliers and dealers but also between suppliers and consuming customers that are
themselves manufacturers; the item in question might be a particularly useful input for
the customer's product and the customer might be seeking to gain an edge over its
competitors by shutting them off from access to the input.
217 See also Bok, supra, note 20 at 283-84.
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In making determinations whether challenged exclusive dealing arrangethe
ments are likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition,
218
RTPC should direct its inquiries toward at least the following areas:
(1) What is the percentage of dealers in the relevant product and geographic areas tied up by the arrangement? A related question is the
market share accounted for by the supplier in question. Where the
exclusive dealing is with consumers rather than dealers, the second
question will be particularly important.
(2) What is the trend in the supplier's market share?2 19
To what extent are other suppliers in the industry also using the
exclusive dealing device? For example, in Standard Stations, while
Standard sold only 6.7 percent of the gasoline in the western area
of the United States, it and its six major competitors had tied up
50 percent of the market under exclusive dealing arrangements. 220
(4) How great would be the costs faced by a new competitor in the
industry in establishing its own distribution network? If, for example, the product is usually sold by outlets that deal in many different types of products the cost to a new competitor of establishing
suitable new outlets will probably be a great deal higher than if the
product is distributed typically by outlets dealing only in that
product. In Mytinger & Casselberry, Judge Burger (as he then was)
dissented in the Court of Appeals for the reason, among others,
that the distribution outlets were door-to-door salesmen, of which
there were potentially a near-infinite number available to other
makers of food supplements.22l
(5) The duration of the contracts is important, and upon occasion in
the United States jurisprudence an exclusive dealing contract, rather
than being declared illegal, has been pared down in duration. 22 The
shorter the duration for which the dealer or other customer is
bound, the more will be the competitive opportunities for other
suppliers to gain the trade. In many cases the real duration of an
arrangement must be distinguished from its nominal duration.
(3)

21

8 The list of factors follows largely the work of Lockhart and Sacks, supra, note
20. See also, Bok, supra, note 20 at 295-304; A.G. Committee, supra, note 76 at 144148; Standard Stations, supra, note 25 at 308. The list of relevant factors assumes that
what will in many cases prove to be the most difficult task, product and geographic
market definition, has been accomplished.
219 For example, in Mytinger & Casselberry, supra, note 89, the consistent trend in
the respondent's market share over a period of some years was downward, a fact to
which the FTC paid little heed in its rush to follow a test of quantitative substantiality.
22

0 Supra, note 25 at 295. See also, R. W. McLaren, Related Problems of Require-

ments Contracts and Acquisitions in Vertical Integration Under the Antitrust Laws
(1950), 45 Ill. L. Rev. 141 at 163-66.
22

1 Supra, note 90 at 541-43.
FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., supra, note 82 (contracts
obligating movie theatre owners to exhibit exclusively the advertising films of respondents
held an "unfair method of competition" when of five-year duration but not "an undue
restraint on competition" when limited to one year).
222
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Where a dealer, as in the Australian Shell proceeding, is bound not
to distribute the goods of a competitor of the supplier after termination of an exclusive dealing arrangement, a contract of short nominal
duration could be of near-perpetual real duration. A service station
operator may not wish to become a door-to-door vitamin salesperson.
(6) Is there vigorous growth of new competition notwithstanding the
arrangement?
Once the anti-competitive effects of a particular case of exclusive dealing
have been measured, there are two other factors, apart from the possible availability of an exemption, that the RTPC may wish to consider. First is the
matter of cost justifications. As indicated earlier, cost savings to the supplier
will have to be treated with care because a sufficiently dominant supplier may
not be inclined to pass such cost savings on to consumers 223 and because the
origin of the saving may be precisely that the supplier knows that he will not
have to contend with competition.2 4 As for cost savings realized by dealers
or customers, such as savings on inventory, these will exist only where the
supplier is positively obligated to fill all of the dealer's requirements. It is not
uncommon in the gasoline industry, for example, for the oil company effectively to leave itself an escape clause whereby the dealer may purchase from
other companies when its regular supplier is unable to make deliveries. There
will, nonetheless, arise cases in which real cost savings, either to supplier or
dealer or both, can be shown, and this favourable factor will have to be put
into the balance of judgments to be made. All of the factors listed are just
that: factors. Taken individually they will point toward different results in the
same case, and it is not possible to state in the abstract which should be given
decisive weight. One final item to be added to the calculus is a consideration
of the least of the evils: would the result of a ban on exclusive dealing be
vertical integration by consignment sales or by merger?225 This is a particularly
cogent consideration in the absence of a merger law with teeth.
As for tied selling, it would not be surprising to see the RTPC eventually
adopt the decidedly jaundiced view that the American courts have taken of
the practice, although it may be noteworthy that in the wording of the legislation Parliament has not, apart from the list of defences, distinguished tied
selling from exclusive dealing: they are equally subject to the standard of
likelihood of substantial lessening of competition. Yet the Commission may
find much force in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's obiter that tied selling serves
hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition. 2 6 The question
of real importance in a particular case, then, will not be "Is competition suppressed?" but rather "How much is substantial?" The writer would hazard
228 TBA Report, supra, note 10 at 95 (recounting views expressed by Professor
Dixon, an expert witness); Lockhart and Sacks, supra, note 20 at 926.
,224 Bok, supra, note 20 at 307.
225 Consignment selling is itself a practice reviewable by the RTPC under section
31.3 of The Act, but only when engaged in to facilitate either resale price maintenance or
price22discrimination, and not when used in lieu of exclusive dealing.
0 Supra, note 25 at 305-06.
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the guess that more of a showing on the substantiality score would be demanded by the RTPC than by the American courts. It is to be hoped that the
Commission will approach with some caution, not exhibited by American
courts, the adjudication of tying situations where the tying product is supplied
at a cheap price. Such a situation could represent a form of price competition
in the tied product and, particularly where the tying product is leased, might
further competition in the customer's industry by reducing the capital costs
incurred to enter that industry as compared with what they would be if the
tying product had to be acquired at its full "market" price.
Although there is a substantial body of scholarship that views tied selling
as a device whose purpose, in very many cases, is the maximization of monopoly profits in the tying product rather than the creation of a further monopoly in the tied product, 27 nonetheless the Combines Investigation Act is
concerned primarily with effects. If the patent or copyright laws do not furnish
sufficient rewards for the creative elements 8in society, it is doubtful that the
gap should be filled by the antitrust laws.=
2 27

Supra, notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
228 Cf. U.S. v. ParamountPictures, Inc., supra, note 102 at 157-58; U.S. v. Loew's
Inc., supra, note 102.

